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This thesis is an examination of the Kennedy election campaign. It is a narrative and 
also a brief examination of how this campaign was put together and how the Kennedy 
campaign staff was formed. The main perspective that it takes is from the vantage point of 
the Cold War which serves as driving force behind the main issues of the campaign. It is the 
primary argument of this thesis that the Kennedy campaign marked a period of transition 
whereby America began to formulate a coherent ideological position for itself as leader of 
the free world and come into its own as a super power with a strong and dynamic vision for 
the future of mankind. Kennedy through the campaign began to symbolize this new active 
vision of the United States as the main shaper of world affairs. Within the context of the 
Cold War, the New Frontier that Kennedy proposed was the consolidation of the emerging 
consumer culture that had been growing into a dominant force in American culture into a 
broader ideological and idealistic vision of modern America that has proved a lasting impact 
on American society. 
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Introduction 
In 1960 America found itself in a period of transition moving from a more 
diplomatic and military phase of the Cold War and into a more ideological and 
political one. Some sixteen years before, the American leadership had come to 
realize that the end of World War II did not mean as well the end of its world wide 
responsibilities. The United States would have to maintain a presence in 
international affairs unprecedented in its history. There would be no escape from 
the dangers of "entangling alliances,,, which George Washington had cautioned the 
nation to avoid. There would be no peacetime disarmament which had been the 
custom of American government throughout its history. Instead, the United States 
found itself expanding foreign obligations, increasing its military budget, and 
involving itself in a protracted struggle for its own survival with nothing less than the 
future of the world at stake. 
American strategy in fighting the Cold War as laid out by State Department 
official George Kennan in his telegram from Moscow in 1947 was essentially a 
strategy of attrition. American Cold War strategists set out a policy of containment 
through treaties and alliances that in conjunction with increased American diplomatic 
and economic pressure would bring about the collapse of the Soviet government. 
Whatever the relative virtues of this policy--they seem to have been proven 
1 
Bryan Wuthrich 
Masters Thesis: The Kennedy Campaign of 1960 
successful from a post-Cold War perspective--its overall strategy of an enforced and 
prolonged stalemate would hardly prove to be appealing to the American people 
who would ultimately have to provide the support to win the war. 
The political problem of presenting to the American people a position for the 
United States in the Cold War that was both appealing and gave them some feeling of 
control and satisfaction began to make itself felt to American leadership early in the 
fifties. The political movements which tried to grapple with an effective American 
ideology in the Cold War during the fifties, however, produced no long-term 
effects. They were the early attempts to formulate some sort of Cold War consensus 
but were either recklessly exuberant or too feint-hearted. The initial popularity of 
Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, for example, was due in no small measure to 
his carefully devised role as a political outsider trying to get a handle on the Cold 
War for the people. Eisenhower also cleverly distanced himself from the 
unappealing nature of containment strategy in his 1952 presidential campaign by 
proposing his own more active policy of "roll back" which would revitalize the 
proven W. W .II themes of liberation in the minds of Americans still uncertain what 
this whole Cold War was about. McCarthy, of course, would eventually wear out 
his welcome with the American people and Eisenhower would think twice about his 
aggressive policy of "roll back" once in office--"roll back" would seem highly ironic 
after the failed Hungarian uprisings of 1956 and the complete failure of the 
Eisenhower administration to provide assistance to the democratic forces there. 
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Entering the 1960 election there was still no clear vision of what the Cold 
War was all about, no concise definition of what Americans had at stake, and no plan 
of what the United States had to offer the world if it were to win. In the previous 
two global conllicts--in fact, in almost any war which America has ever involved 
itself with--there were high minded and universal principles which were given as the 
basis for American participation. Neither of those two wars were presented to the 
American public as an effort to preserve the status quo; through Wilson's Fourteen 
Points and Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter the unfortunate state of warfare was seen as a 
catharsis for a better future. No proposals of similar substance had been done in the 
Cold War in the years leading up to 1960. Something of comparable nature to either 
the Atlantic Charter or Fourteen Points would be of obvious value in building the 
support and moral of the American people, but even more importantly they would 
be of infmite value in promoting America's image throughout the developing world 
where the real battle of the Cold War was increasingly being fought. 
When John F. Kennedy kicked off his campaign for the presidency of the 
United States at the beginning of 1960, he did so with the concept of this period of 
transition in the Cold War from a diplomatic and military phase to an ideological and 
political phase firmly entrenched in the back of his mind. He and his campaign staff 
were hopeful that this theme of a new era in American history would be a resonant 
one with the American people and that it would echo his particular capabilities as a 
leader. The Cold War, therefore, served as a crucial backdrop to the campaign of 
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JFK. This thesis is a history of the key events and themes of that campaign and while 
the main issues which Kennedy had to grapple with, his religion, his age, the broader 
domestic issues of civil rights, and the enigmatic issue of national purpose were not 
directly related to the Cold War--they would have all been prominent issues in 
American presidential politics even during its pre-Cold War history--they were all 
nonetheless brought into sharper focus and strongly influenced by it. 
The metaphor of the "new frontier,, which the Kennedy campaign staff created 
over the course of the campaign served to formulate an ideology of America, s Cold 
War purpose. This transformed America,s effort in this struggle from a war of 
attrition and stagnation into one action and meaning. Furthermore, the "new 
frontier,, and the Kennedy campaign served as a larger metaphor for what life in the 
modern world would be like. It laid the psychological ground work for a new world 
of limitless possibilities unhindered by the restrictions of the past and formulated a 
new vision of what an American citizen should be. The "new frontier'' beckoned 
with a vision of a secular world where the rights of all religions would be respected 
yet where religion in general would be marginalized in American culture. In the 
place of religion, the "new frontier" posited a life of personal fulfillment as had long 
been promoted through consumerism. It created from the process of consumerism a 
deeper message of freedom of choice, freedom of expression, and more importantly 
called for each citizen to realize himself or herself as pioneers on this "new frontier" 
of human existence. 
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In chronicling the main events leading up to and during the election, special 
focus will be put on the role of presidential election in American society. What were 
the cultural factors that motivated John Kennedy to want to become president? The 
question will also be raised: what is it that the American culture looks for in a 
president and what in particular was it about John Kennedy that was so appealing 
then and even remains so now? What is the role of a presidential election in building 
a national consensus and establishing national ideals? And ultimately, how well docs 
it now serve its intended purpose of fostering public debate and arriving at valid 
conclusions in its general function of maintaining a free and rational society. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Making of the Candidate 
The family 
One unique aspect that must be taken into account in any examination of 
Kennedy or his presidential campaign is the Kennedy name itself, or rather the family 
that lies behind that name. With perhaps the exception of the Roosevelt and Adams 
families, no other name carries with it the same legacy as that of the Kennedy 
family--for shear impact on a specific era in history a slight edge could probably be 
given to the Kennedy' s in that they, at the same time, had in office a president, an 
attorney general, and a U.S. senator. Only by examining some understanding of the 
family and its background can one get some understanding of what was behind the 
Kennedy presidential campaign and how it came together. 
It has become a truism in history that it was primarily family ambition that 
drove John F. Kennedy into politics. Upon the unfortunate death of his elder 
brother in an ill fated bombing run over Europe at the close of the World War II, it 
was expected of John, as the next in line, to step up and carry on the family name to 
new achievements in the wake of their patriarch, Joseph P. Kennedy. One trait has 
been forever linked to Joseph Kennedy, and subsequently to all Kennedys, and that 
trait was ambition. 
The Kennedys were notoriously ambitious. In looking at their ambition 
historians have tended to approach it in two contrasting ways. The frrst and most 
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flattering way could be summed up in a line often associated with the Kennedys: 
((most men see things as they are and ask why? I look upon things that have never 
been and ask why not?" In this light we can see the Kennedy ambition in fighting for 
civil rights and for putting a man on the moon. The contrasting way oflooking upon 
Kennedy ambition has taken shape more recently and approaches it from an irrational 
and destructive need to dominate and win at all costs. It has been best exemplified by 
the notorious womanizing among Kennedy men. It is more than likely that much of 
this more negative view on Kennedy ambition is a backlash to the perhaps overly 
idealistic view that has dominated the Kennedy image since the tragic assassinations 
of both John and Robert. A better understanding of this ambition, however could be 
attained by examining its origins and placing it within that context. 
Coming from an immigrant background, specifically from an Irish Catholic 
immigrant background, it would be safe to say that the Kennedy family, and the 
Fitzgerald family (JFK's maternal grandparents), were well aware of power and the 
dangers of not having enough of it. The immigrant experience as it was lived in the 
United States during the latter half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth was notoriously difficult, but beyond the sentimental portraits of hard 
working and simple immigrants there is a more compelling vision of a hard nosed 
battle for survival. Brought over mainly as fodder for the new and expanding 
industry of America and the profit of its leaders, immigrants learned quickly to band 
together within their own respective groups and fight to stake out a place for 
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themselves in their new world, but it was this enforced closeness combined with 
their Old World heritage of clandestine organization for self-defense that made the 
Boston Irish political in a way unrivaled by any other immigrant group. [ 1] The 
degree to which the Boston Irish Catholics were politicized and the success which 
they had in making their organized influence felt often drew the ire and contempt of 
the more established and "respectable" members of society. This suspicion of the 
moral character of immigrants was often a subtle means of keeping them on the 
defensive and thereby keeping them in their place. The Boston Brahmins would 
speak contemptuously of the Irish political wards calling their leaders "muckrakers" 
toiling in the mud of creation yet ignorant of the celestial beauty that lay above their 
heads. But in the immigrant's struggle for survival, ambition was perhaps the only 
distinction between life and death and the only way in which they could maintain 
some sense of dignity in a world where their lives were held to be very cheap. In this 
unforgiving environment, power was the only currency that had any real value and 
was therefore not a trifle nor was its open pursuit looked upon as undignified. 
As an Irishman, Joseph Kennedy was probably even more acutely aware than 
other immigrants of what power in this New World meant and what the potential 
dangers of not possessing it were. In America, as in Ireland, power had a name and a 
background and that name and background was Anglo-Saxon and Protestant, two 
concepts with which JPK was intimately familiar and from which he was congenitally 
excluded. Joseph Kennedy had no misconceptions about the make-up of the world 
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in which he was working but with a confidence that was not unusual among many 
immigrant families he believed that America was truly a land of opportunity and also 
that he could change that world. That was probably the extent of his sentimentality 
concerning the American Dream and he was otherwise able through hard work, 
guile, and some rule-bending to complete the first elementary requisite of power, 
money. Joseph Kennedy came into the world with the advantages of a solidly 
middle-class background but while still a relatively young man he went on to become 
one of the richest men in the country. That, however, was only one half, and perhaps 
the easiest part of the puzzle. Money was sufficient to get him access to the channels 
of power but gaining acceptance in that incestuous labyrinth of personal connections 
where the real business of the country was done was another matter. 
It is worth noting--even if it is fairly obvious--that America in the days of 
Joseph Kennedy was subject to many unseen and unspoken restrictions. The 
prohibition laws that Joseph Kennedy has often, with scorn, been accused of having 
broken are an example of just this kind of undemonstrative hostility. Behind their 
more obvious intention to improve public morality, there has also been noted a 
deliberate attempt by some of the more entrenched immigrants of Anglo-Saxon or 
Protestant heritage to exercise control over the newer immigrants through what was 
viewed as their degenerative, and perhaps Catholic, habit of drink. There were, of 
course, a myriad of other ways in which outsiders like the Kennedys could be made 
to feel unwelcome. Much like in Ireland, in America many of those in power saw a 
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man like JPK and his heritage as being suspect and not worthy oflegitimate power. 
Unfortunately, the language of respectability has often been laden with cultural and 
racial baggage and a tendency toward exclusion. 
To his credit, Joseph Kennedy was not unduly intimidated by such sentiment, 
and while it is not the intention of this author to exonerate all of his actions or to 
state that his character was beyond all repute, it is still important to recognize that 
many of the criticisms of his impropriety and ruthlessness, as accurate as some of 
them may be, were, and to some degree still are, also laced with the less compelling 
accusation of racial illegitimacy. To many Anglo-Saxons there was something 
decidedly out of place about an Irishman running around in their world and 
presuming to be their equal. To them the Irish were laborers. They were not 
blessed with a cultural disposition to understand the more elevated concepts of 
civilization and power. The simple fact of the matter was that an immigrant could 
either accept this and resign himself to his designated position in life or he could 
fight it. If he chose, like Joseph Kennedy, to fight it, however, he would find open 
to him only the somewhat more suspect and less legitimate avenues to success. For 
Joseph Kennedy it was always his self-designated job to claim his share of the power 
and it would consequently always be the job of his predecessors to power to label 
him with the title of outsider. Historians in judging the Kennedys have to take this 
into account as well as the general move among all immigrants towards the claim of 
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power and respectability in order to arrive at an accurate and fair assessment of the 
"Kennedy ambition." 
Though JPK managed to find some legitimacy through the title of Ambassador 
which he scrupulously maintained all his life (he was appointed U. S. Ambassador to 
the Court of St. James by Franklin Roosevelt just prior to WWII), his career in 
politics eventually came upon a dead end . This probably had less to do with simple 
prejudice than his own shortcomings perhaps further inflamed through prejudice. In 
his tremendous and mercurial rise to prominence, JPK had too many rough edges lo 
move effectively and subtly through the thorny corridors of power--perhaps, one 
such loose end was his own complicated feelings toward the English in particular and 
the British Empire in general which made his own appointment as U .S. Ambassador 
to England somewhat ironic and which also may have clouded his judgment 
concerning the rise of Adolph Hitler. Probably with this in mind, Joseph saw to it 
that each of his sons would have the habits of power that would allow him to succeed 
where he had failed. All of his sons would attend English-style prep schools and 
would go on to graduate, as he had, from that bastion of Anglo-American elitism and 
power , Harvard University. JFK became something of an Anglophile; or, at least as 
much of one as any Kennedy could be. The Kennedys, though defiant Irish 
Catholics, were nonetheless adaptable. 
Under their father's tutelage, all the Kennedy boys developed that sense of 
assuredness and confidence that would later become the Kennedy mystique. His 
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support for his sons was without question and nearly without limit. JFK often 
remarked that his father would many times fight with him tooth and nail about any 
given subject but would still give his full support even when he went against his 
father's advice or wishes. Clearly there is evidence of the father living out his destiny 
through his sons but what son would not want the attention and support of his father 
in his struggles with life? And whatever his personal ambitions may have been, there 
does not seem to be any trace of unreasonable or selfish pressure placed on his sons. 
He seems to have been an affectionate and loving father despite his demanding 
nature; it is for this reason that President Kennedy upon visiting his father just after 
his stroke said to one of his aids, "that man is r esponsible for it all. "[2] 
It is interesting to note how little reference there is to the Kennedy matriarch, 
Rose Kennedy, by any of the Kennedy sons in discussing their family background. 
JFK even made some rather unkind remarks about his mother's lack of presence in 
the family referring to her as something of a nonentity whose only response to life's 
problems was to go shopping in Paris. [3] JFK's comments about his mother are too 
rare arrive at anykind of solid understanding of his true feelings toward her beyond 
the odd remark made on the spur of the moment. It probably can be said, however, 
that her apparently passive role is somewhat deceptive. Rose Kennedy and her 
daughters as well had an eye for style and presentation, and although they were not 
active as spokeswomen for their family in the sense that they shared the stage equally 
with the Kennedy men, it seems clear that they worked very hard behind the scenes 
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and took great satisfaction in making sure that the young Kennedy men looked and 
acted in a polished and presentable manner. Since Kennedy's image, was so central 
to his appeal as a candidate the importance of this involvement by Rose Kennedy and 
her daughters in John Kennedy' s effectiveness as a politician should not be 
overlooked. 
The Kennedy family had a tremendous influence on JFK , and it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to examine its influence on his psychology in any kind of depth. 
Its influence on the campaign of 1960, however , is only slightly less great and 
therefore has to be considered. President Truman, in explaining his reasons for not 
supporting JFK in the primaries, said: "it's not the Pope but the pop that I'm 
against." The Kennedys could draw equal amounts of hostility as they could draw 
admiration and much of that hostility has tended to focus around their family 
ambition. One could question why anyone would want to subject their son to the 
ordeal of campaigning for and holding the office of the presidency. A fair argument 
could be made that such an endeavor is unbalanced right from the outset ; however, 
this nation of immigrants was founded upon the dream that any immigrant family, no 
matter how humble its origins, could one day live to see one of its own assume the 
greatest office of the land. Somewhere between the purity of that ideal and the 
reality of the Kennedy campaign for the presidency is where one can fmd the true 
nature of the much vaunted and vilified Kennedy ambition. 
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Learning the ropes 
That Kennedy name, of course, is also very much connected to the concept of 
wealth and another one of the great rumors that was always attached to the Kennedy 
campaigns was that they were in effect purchased by their wealth, that JFK relied 
primarily upon his fathers money to win his elections. While of course the extra 
money with which JFK was allowed to pad his campaign funds was certainly some 
help to his cause, it would be a gross exaggeration to state that Kennedy relied upon 
his wealth to win elections. From his first election in the 1946 to his last election in 
1960, JFK proved to be one of the most hard fighting and hard working campaigners 
of his day. During any given campaign, JFK followed rigorous schedules and endless 
days for weeks on end and in most cases simply out-worked his opponent. [4] 
His first political campaign began in 1946 and was for the 11 th congressional 
district of Massachusetts for United States House of Representatives. After the grief 
oflosing his eldest son Joseph, the Kennedy patriarch was intent upon his second 
son, John, pursuing a political career. The quiet and bookish Jack, however, hardly 
seemed suited to political life. Sick with various ailments for most of his life, JFK 
was somewhat introverted and seemed more content to become a professor or 
journalist. But his own experience as a correspondent for the Potsdam conference 
and as a correspondent for the United Nations conference at San Francisco brought 
him face-to-face with the great issues of his time. [5] Having appreciated the 
momentous events that lay in the future for the United States and the world, JFK 
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became more concerned with acting upon them rather than writing about them. By 
the beginning of 1946, Kennedy was ready to follow a political career. 
In trying to convince the young law school graduate, John Droney, to join his 
fledgling campaign for the U.S. House, JFK would use this theme of the historical 
import and impending change as he would later do throughout his career. When 
Droney protested that he had no interest in politics and that he had to get started in 
his own law practice, Kennedy replied: "if we,re going to change things the way they 
should be changed, we all have to do things we don't want to do." 
"I went to see him intending not to become involved, but with that little 
speech I went completely the other way," Droney later recalled, explaining how he 
became one of Jack's most active workers in 1946 and treasurer of the Kennedy 
campaign organization. "I thought to myself, he has a very winning way and he is 
obviously sincere, so I asked him immediately how I could help." [ 6] 
It is important to place this statement within the context of the United States 
at the close of World War II. Such statements which in this day seem hopelessly trite 
were then, in an era of tremendous optimism, far more meaningful. Kennedy, 
himself a veteran and having been wounded in the war, was probably as caught up in 
the emotion that formed the basis of his rhetoric as was his intended audience. In any 
case, he was able through the strength of his convictions and character as well as 
through his rapidly developing charm and wit to win to his side a growing contingent 
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of loyal and capable campaign workers who would be the core of his future campaign 
efforts. 
In a stroke of good luck for Kennedy, it just so happened in 1946 that the 
eleventh congressional district became vacated by the newly elected mayor of 
Boston, James Curley, a longtime Irish political figure and character in Boston area 
politics. This was the same district which JFK's grandfather, John F. Fitzgerald, 
represented some years before. Although the district had some sentimental 
association with JFK, he was only vaguely aware of it and its constituents were only 
vaguely aware of him. 
Close presidential aide and confident David Powers recalls that he did not 
give Kennedy much of a chance in the rough-and-tumble world of Boston politics. In 
a Democratic primary that fielded ten candidates, most of whom had favorite son 
status in either Charlestown, the North End, Cambridge, Beacon Hill, or Allston 
which made up the cities of the eleventh district, Kennedy at first appeared to many 
local constituents as merely a carpetbagger. As another famous Boston political 
figure, connoisseur of politicking, and replacement for JFK in the House of 
Representatives when he became Senator in 1952 Tip O'Neil once said: "all politics 
is local". In the eleventh congressional district at the start of his campaign Kennedy 
was a local nonentity. 
Into this uphill battle Kennedy threw himself with all the resources and skill 
he could command. In one of the young candidate's first political speeches to the 
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Gold Star Mothers at the American Legion hall in Charlestown, Kennedy began to 
show the ability to hold an audience that would later become the hallmark of his 
campaigns. In remembering that night, David Powers later said: 
I had been to a lot ef political talks in Charlestown, but I never saw a reaction like this 
one. I heard those women sayin9 to each other, ' isn't he a wondeiful boy, he reminds 
me so much ef my own John, or my Bob.' They all had stars in their eyes. It took him a 
ha!f an hour to pull himself away from them. They didn't want him to leave. I said to 
myself, I don't know what this 9uy's 9ot. He's no 9reat orator and doesn't say much, 
but they certainly 90 crazy over him.{7] 
After Kennedy had fmally managed to make his way out of the hall, he turned to 
Powers and said to him, "How do you think I did?" To which, Powers responded, 
"You were terrific. I've never seen such a reaction from a crowd of people in my 
whole life. 11 
"Then do you think you'll be with me?" Kennedy asked. 
"I'm already with you, 11 Powers replied. And many years later when recalling 
the event, Powers added sadly, "And I stayed with him from that day until 
November 22, 1963, when I was riding in the car behind him in Dallas. 11 [8] 
From his first campaign in 1946 to his last campaign in 1960, Kennedy's 
campaign staff was constantly getting larger. Kennedy always saw to it that he would 
attract the best and brightest minds to his side of the election battle, and he invariably 
did. It was not Kennedy's money that brought these men over. In fact, many of his 
most loyal and trustworthy aides have confessed to being a little skeptical at first, 
often sketching a Little Lord Fauntleroy image as their preconceived impression of 
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him. Instead, it was Kennedy himself who won them over. His confident and 
optimistic attitude, his quick and focused mind, and his charming aura were all 
attributes that each of these men came away with upon their frrst meeting with 
Kennedy, attributes which of course money can help in attaining but which can not 
be purchased outright as they require a personal commitment and some natural 
comprehension to be mastered. A great many wealthy men, perhaps even including 
JFK's own father, lack these very qualities. One may ask where Kennedy might have 
picked up these skills. There does not seem to be any clear answer, although 
intuition may point to his mother and his many sisters as likely motivating forces as 
well as an excellent sounding board and safe audience on which he could have 
practiced these skills as a boy. 
Putting together a good campaign staff is a necessary step for any successful 
campaign. But that is only the beginning. An organization has to be put in place to 
round up the necessary delegates, to recognize and contact the local political leaders, 
and to recruit and train a volunteer workforce. A successful candidate also has to 
create a system for canvassing and getting his name out to his potential constituency. 
The foundation for all these elements was laid out during Kennedy's successful 1946 
bid for the House of Representatives and improved upon during his next two 
senatorial campaigns of 1952 and 1958. 
Starting in 1946, Kennedy created a file of names of important delegates and 
political leaders that would grow ever larger until in the years before 1960 reaching a 
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nationwide scope. Kennedy, it has often been noted, showed an uncanny ability to 
spot just who mattered politically in any given area and win them over to his side. 
As his campaigns grew he was still able from memory to remember almost all of the 
various local politicos throughout the broad area his campaigns encompassed. [9] 
Kennedy's volunteer campaign force was legendary in its dedication and hard 
work and campaign organizers would grow to rely upon them in the future. 
Organizers, for example, would send them out to collect signatures--they collected 
262,324 signatures for Kennedis nomination paper for the U.S. Senate in 1952, the 
most in Massachusetts history (only 2,500 names were required by law) . They were 
also asked to deliver Kennedy literature from door to door by hand instead of 
through the mail as was commonly the practice, with the idea that receiving such 
information was much more effective if done in person. According to Kenneth 
O'Donnell; we learned that "the worst mistake you can make in running a political 
campaign is to gather a crowd of enthusiastic supporters who are eager to help the 
candidate and not give them any work to do." [10] In a Kennedy campaign there 
would never be any shortage of volunteers or of work for them to do. 
In 1946, the young Kennedy, perhaps already thinking ahead to a nationwide 
profile, tried to distance himself as much as possible from the local campaign rituals 
of Boston politics. Much to the dismay of both his father and his campaign staff, 
Kennedy refused to wear a hat as was custom for Boston politicians --he would show 
the same stubbornness during his presidential campaign in refusing to wear the 
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traditional Texas ten gallon cowboy hat when campaigning with Lyndon Johnson 
through his home state. Kennedy also tried to trim much of the overblown rhetoric 
that had become a staple of Boston political speech making from his own campaign 
speeches. But aside from these departures, Kennedy remained true to the most 
essential element of the Irish American campaign style: he would take himself out 
and to the best of his ability try to engage each of the voters in a personal and 
face-to -face manner. This, many times, included actually going out and standing on 
a street corner and physically shaking hands with every man and woman who passed. 
Kennedy would often rise very early in the morning in order to go to a local factory 
to shake the hand of every worker as he or she passed under the factory gate, have 
breakfast, and repeat the process at another factory. [ 11] 
In his first campaign, Kennedy and one of his aides went out into the streets of 
the local Boston neighborhoods and rang door bells in order to personally introduce 
himself to each of the neighborhood residents. It is easy to imagine the surprise and 
appreciation of these people to frnd a candidate for the U.S. House of 
Representatives waiting on their doorstep and asking for their vote. This sort of 
campaign method, naturally, would prove more difficult to reproduce in Kennedy's 
larger campaigns in the future, but even in his senate and presidential campaigns he 
and his staff would constantly be on the lookout for techniques with which to 
maintain this style. 
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Since Kennedy>s style is central to his appeal in the 1960 campaign, it is 
worthwhile here to take some time to try and define it so that we can follow how it 
develops during the narrative. Probably the best approach to define Kennedy's style 
is to determine it through what it was not. It was not like the traditional campaign 
style of Boston's Anglo-Saxon community which could be described as a style of 
polite and objective distance. Kennedy' s technique of personal and informal appeal 
comes from an immigrant tradition which set itself in deliberate contrast to the 
reserved Anglo-Saxon technique of campaigning. As a means of turning the tables on 
their more established rivals, immigrant groups developed a technique of provocative 
informality which often made their Yankee rivals uncomfortable frequently making 
them to appear stuffy and close-minded. The most successful in this style of 
campaigning in Boston was James Curley who had a manner and demeanor that was 
as loved by the immigrant community of Boston as it was reviled by the Anglo-Saxon 
community--these two reactions often had a mutually reinforcing effect on each 
other, the more the immigrants loved Curley, the more the Yankees despised him 
and visa versa. 
Yet Kennedy's campaign style could also be described through its contrast to 
traditional immigrant styles such as Curley. No matter how much Curley was loved 
by Boston area immigrants, and particularly Irish immigrants, as being one of their 
own and no matter how much they would defend him against his critics, the simple 
fact of the matter was that some of the criticism hit too close to home. Curley' s 
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brutish manner and more importantly his obvious corruption were very often a 
source of embarrassment. The Kennedys in general tried to distance themselves 
from these courser elements of their immigrant background and Kennedy in 
particular tried to fashion for himself a campaign style that was more polished and 
sophisticated and more representative of the upwardly mobile future of the 
immigrant community while still remaining faithful to its roots. The result is a style 
that is once open and friendly in a way that the Boston Brahmins could not be as it is 
refmed and upright in a way that traditional Boston area politicos like Curley could 
not be. Kennedy developed the unique ability of being regal without seeming aloof. 
In the larger campaigns, it was of course impossible to bring Kennedy around 
door to door to meet personally with all his voters. One such way to achieve similar 
results while also conserving the limited energies Kennedy was to concentrate their 
prospective targets into a single whole. The Kennedy campaign staff were always 
very much alive to the danger of spreading their candidate too thin and wearing him 
out midway through the campaign so they sought wherever possible to bring 
together potential voters into groups. One such way would later go on to be a 
standard feature of any future Kennedy campaign, the famous Kennedy tea parties. 
Aide to President Kennedy, Kenneth O'Donnell, explains that in the early part of 
the 1946 campaign JFK's sisters came up with this idea of contacting local women's 
groups and encouraging them to sponsor a tea party for JFK where all the local 
women could get together, discuss whatever issues they had in mind, and meet with 
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the candidate. One of the great advantages to the large size of the Kennedy family 
was the great resource of dedicated and talented support they could provide. It has 
already been noted how instrumental the patriarch, Joseph, was to Jack's campaign 
and we shall look more into the crucial role played by the brothers, particularly 
Robert, but the Kennedy women, who actually out-numbered the men, would prove 
a veritable force in all the Kennedy campaigns. Rose and the sisters, could arrange 
three or four of these tea parties to be staggered throughout the night and would do 
this for a number of nights each week. JFK would make his arrival, meet the ladies 
and carry on some discussion with them, and be gone in no more than an half an 
hour to move on to the next party, leaving a Kennedy woman to stay behind just as 
she had been there in advance to attend to the details. Many of JFK 1 s aids thought 
that a tea party in the largely working class neighborhoods that made up Boston 
would seem "highfalutin" and thus a bad idea but the Kennedy women convinced 
them otherwise. They were able, consequently, to cultivate around Kennedy and 
the Kennedy family an aura of style and sophistication to which many women of the 
rising lower and middle classes sought to aspire. Issues, of course, may have been 
the topic of discussion but many a keen eye was also focused on what the Kennedys 
were wearing and how they were behaving. 
In the tight race of the 1952 senatorial campaign against the highly polished 
and much respected Henry Cabot Lodge, the social graces figured prominently since 
Lodge represented the prominent Boston Anglo-Saxons, often referred to as 
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Brahmins, who for many were the very image of propriety and style. The tea parties 
helped establish the Kennedys as a new source for social r espectability leading some 
to say upon JFK's victory over Lodge that the Kennedys were the new Brahmins. 
[ 12] The Kennedy women were also quick to point out that JFK' s narrow margin of 
victory in that race, some seventy thousand votes, was exactly the number of 
women who were brought together by the tea parties. 
There was another crucial event of the Kennedy campaign against Lodge that 
would serve him greatly in his future endeavors, particularly against Richard Nixon. 
As has already been noted, Lodge was a greatly respected politician who was 
considered by many to be an imposing figure of authority in comparison to the 
youthful and inexperienced Kennedy. Many thought that a debate between the two 
would highlight this contrast so Lodge was quick to accept when a debate was 
proposed in October, 1952. Kennedy performed magnificently showing a great 
command of statistics that would become a trademark of his debating and oratorical 
style while also further developing his wit. In one quick night before television 
cameras and radio microphones, Kennedy was able to establish himself to the voting 
public as Lodge's equal in expertise and ability while also showing none of the 
condescension that his rival was apt to display. [13] It was a turning point in the 
campaign. 
The final and perhaps most crucial development in the Kennedy campaign 
staff that took place during the 19 5 2 senatorial campaign was the addition of brother 
24 
Bryan Wuthrich 
Masters Thesis: The Kennedy Campaign of 1960 
Robert to the staff as campaign manager. As late as the spring of 1952, according to 
aide Kenneth O'Donnell, the much-touted Kennedy campaign machine was 
completely floundering. Despite having amassed a tremendous file of names of 
leading politicos throughout Massachusetts, nothing had been done to set up an 
organization and no local managers, or "secretaries" as the Kennedy organization 
liked to call them, had been chosen since JFK himself had made no decisions on these 
matters and had not delegated the authority to do so. To make things worse Joseph 
Kennedy, amidst all the confusion, was working behind the scenes to take over the 
campaign and put it in the hands of some of his friends amongst the Old Guard 
Democrats, something which JFK did not want. Kennedy, however, seemed 
oblivious and no one on his campaign staff was able to get across to him the sense of 
urgency concerning the poor state of his campaign. 
In frustration, O'Donnell decided to call on Robert who at the time was still 
working at the Justice Department. Robert's initial reaction was to keep out of any 
argument between his brother and his father. "Don't drag me into it," was his 
response to O'Donnell. After imparting to him the dire straights his brother's 
campaign was in and giving him a sense of its impending disaster, Robert quickly 
became interested and promised to intervene between his father and his brother by 
calling Joseph Kennedy. Not long after this, Robert called O'Donnell from a tea 
party in Quincy, Massachusetts, interrupting O'Donnell 's golf game saying: "there 
you are playing golf. . . and I'm here with a couple of thousand women in Quincy , 
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thanks to you. I hope you're satisfied. Get down here right away. I want you to tell 
Jack some of that stuff you've been telling me." 
JFK was furious with O'Donnell for telling his brother and ultimately his 
father about the sorry state of his campaign, but it was the opinion of many on his 
campaign staff that it was Robert who, upon coming in and taking over as campaign 
manager, saved his election bid in 1952. While JFK showed a complete dedication 
before the public, RFK showed an equal dedication behind the scenes making sure 
that all the details were attended to and taking care of the difficult or dirty jobs that 
no one else would address. 
Robert could be ruthless in his dedication to his brother. For instance in that 
19 5 2 campaign then Democratic governor of Massachusetts and head of the state's 
party, Paul Dever, had initially requested separate campaign staffs everywhere in the 
state except for Boston because he thought Kennedy' s chances against Lodge were 
unlikely given the impending shift to Republicanism under Eisenhower. He then 
changed his mind when his own re-election seemed less certain and Kennedy' s 
chances much better. It was Robert who steadfastly refused his Democratic party 
leader's request. Dever had some choice words to say of Robert during that incident 
and soon after called Joseph to caution him to never allow his son Robert, "the brat", 
to call him again--Dever went on to lose the governorship that year. This is but one 
example of what would be Robert's growing reputation as a political pit bull for his 
brother(14]. It is worth noting that in this example, as would often be the case, it 
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was Robert who the injured party blamed and not John. Believing that it was Robert 
who was acting on his own volition and exuberance for the cause, Dever never 
blamed JFK; this, of course, was in a strict sense the case but Robert was always 
acting with his brother's tacit support and approval. 
After winning the Massachusetts seat in the Senate in 1952, the next big step 
of the Kennedy campaign organization in its ultimate bid for the presidency was, 
ironically, experiencing its first loss. Coming into the Democratic National 
Convention in 1956, Kennedy had quite by accident gotten himself embroiled in an 
intra-party over control of the state organization with the leader of the Massachusetts 
Democratic Party and one of the Democrat's most prominent national figures, John 
McCormack. Kennedy did so against the advice of his father (this was already 
becoming a trend) who cautioned him not to get "into the gutter with those bums." 
But this hard fought battle for political control of his own state has been described as 
his coming of age as a politician [1 5] and set the stage for Kennedy to head to the 
Democratic National Convention in Chicago as the leader of the Massachusetts 
delegation. Otherwise, Kennedy would have been just another delegate on the 
floor. As it was, Kennedy came to represent a new figure of stature in the party 
because he had beaten the Old Guard's McCormack. This, in addition to the fact 
that his victory in 195 2 was one of the few successes of the Democratic Party that 
year, made Kennedy stand out and thus he was sought after as a speaker. 
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When Stevenson threw open the nomination for the vice president to the 
floor of the convention, Kennedy and his staff saw an opportunity and at the last 
minute the Kennedy for Vice President campaign was put into motion. Once again 
against the advice of his father, Kennedy and his staff began working the floor to get 
his nomination and only narrowly missed succeeding. In retrospect, JPK was right. 
Sharing the ticket in what was a losing campaign could have spelled the end for 
Kennedy, but getting his feet wet was probably worth the risk. Not that Kennedy 
was working for anything less than victory; Kennedy really wanted the vice 
presidential nomination and was bitterly disappointed when he lost it. But, as it 
worked out, Kennedy needed to get some experience in the workings of national 
politics and the nominating process, and this was a crucial learning experience for 
him and one that would serve him well at the next convention in 1960. It was the 
luckiest loss of his career. 
Another loss also served to help the future Kennedy presidential campaign. 
By nearly all accounts, Stevenson's 1956 presidential campaign was an absolute 
failure, but there to watch the whole thing unfold was Robert Kennedy who was 
engaged by Stevenson as an aide. No one on the campaign staff has any vivid 
recollections of Robert as he did not make his presence strongly felt. From the 
background, Robert Kennedy managed to record, as he would refer to it later, a 
virtual blue-print of how not to run a campaign. [16] By 1956, JFK and his staff 
were already thinking ahead to the presidential election of 1960. 
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Shortly after the convention, Kennedy would add to his staff speech writer 
Theodore Sorensen and pollster Lou Harris. By 1957, Kennedy was already touring 
the nation in a whirlwind series of speaking engagements with Sorensen. The final 
crucial addition to the still-secret Kennedy for President Campaign was Pierre 
Salinger in 1959 who would serve as press coordinator. 
Thus was born through a conglomeration of tireless ambition, idealism, 
wealth, circumstance, calculation and determination, as well as fortune and dumb 
luck, the political career of John F. Kennedy. By 1959, it was poised to attack the 
summit of American politics. Everything by 1959 was in place. All that was 
necessary was to begin. 
29 
Bryan Wuthrich 
Masters Thesis: The Kennedy Campaign of 1960 
CHAPTER TWO 
The Candidate 
The presidential campaign begins 
On October 28, 1959, the last and most important of two organizational 
meetings for the upcoming Kennedy campaign took place in Hyannis, Massachusetts. 
ln attendance were, among others: Robert Kennedy, Steven Smith, Lou Harris, 
Kenneth O'Donnel, Ted Sorensen, Ted Kennedy, and Pierre Salinger . As Theodore 
White so aptly points out in his history of this campaign, it is the campaign staff of 
this and a few other candidates, a handful of men, that work out amongst themselves 
what will be the main issues of the coming ten or so months of the campaign season. 
While most Americans are innocently and unawaredly going about their business and 
attending to their immediate concerns, these men are hard at work trying to set up in 
advance the issues that will dominate the minds of Americans in the ensuing few 
months. [17] Their effective use of the media will determine whether their work is a 
success or a failure. 
The two main issues that the campaign staff singled out in this advance 
meeting were Kennedy's religion and his age. The country had never before elected 
a Catholic as president of the United States and the stinging defeat of candidate Al 
Smith, who was the first Catholic to run for that office in 1928, was still fresh in the 
minds of many. Also, JFK was potentially the youngest successful candidate in U.S. 
history--Theodore Roosevelt was actually younger than Kennedy when he first 
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assumed the office of the presidency in 1901 but he did so not as a candidate but as 
the next in line after the assassination of McKinley. 
These were the two issues which the Kennedy campaign had to get firmly in 
hand and shape to their candidate's advantage if there was to be any hope of success 
in the 1960 election. Much of the subsequent rhetoric that came out of the Kennedy 
campaign was shaped around these issues. The focus on the New Generation and the 
New Frontier as themes in the election was, as we shall see, an intelligent turning of 
the youth issue to the advantage of the Kennedy campaign. In an America that was 
coming into its own after World War II, one that was moving from the cities to the 
suburbs, and one that saw the biggest increase in birth rate in its history, Kennedy ' s 
youthful aura was really more of a positive factor that a negative one. Also the issue 
of religion, in a nation that was striving to move beyond the divisions of its past in 
order to assume its new position as leader of the free world, became something of a 
litmus test to the free thinking and tolerance of the American people, due in no small 
part to the work of the Kennedy campaign. A strong theme in American politics and 
culture during the 1950s which really came into fruition during the 1960s was a new 
vision of American citizenship independent of any racial or religious background. 
Whereas in the past the identity of American citizenship was strongly rooted within 
the Anglo-Protestant cultural tradition, America, primarily through the work of the 
Supreme Court, but also as a result of changing demographics and world conditions, 
began to view citizenship through the prism of legal definitions that worked to 
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obviate cultural distinctions--these legal definitions were increasingly formulated in 
the later twentieth century under the premise that cultural values should be excluded 
from all examinations of the rights of American citizens. Kennedy was, of course, 
quick to use this trend to his advantage by constantly stressing the separation 
between his personal and public self through his calling upon constitutional rights 
guaranteed him as a citizen. While Kennedy and many other Americans could point 
to their passport as a possible affirmation of their status as U. S. citizens, these legal 
defmitions of citizenship were earlier in the century less compelling than the cultural 
definitions which were then more dominant. You could be a bona fide U.S. citizen 
on paper, but that did not necessarily make you as much of a citizen as some others at 
least with respect to having the privilege to be able hold positions of power and 
esteem in society. Kennedy' s arguments mirrored those of other backgrounds like 
many leaders in the civil rights movement who sought to use the tremendous amount 
of pride Anglo-Saxons took in the systems of jurisprudence as a means of claiming 
their own rights as citizens under the law. With respect to Kennedy and his Catholic 
background many American Protestants took exception to his using their own beliefs 
against them--at least King was a Protestant and believed like they do but a Catholic 
claiming rights which his own faith had originally (and in many cases still) denied 
Protestants, that was too much--but we will get to that later. 
Though the Kennedy staff were quick to recognize the potential advantages of 
these two crucial issues of youth and enlightened tolerance, it would take time for 
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them to work out how they would use these issues as themes within the Kennedy 
campaign. To refine somewhat Theodore White's observation mentioned earlier, 
although a few men would set the agenda of the great discourse that is an American 
presidential election, they would do so in conjunction with the population of the 
nation. Ultimately, the process resembles something of a controlled dialogue 
between the campaign staff and the nation through the auspices of the media with 
each theme and idea put forth by the staff constantly remolded in response to the 
reactions of the voting audience. 
Kennedy o ffi c ially announces his candidacy . 
On Saturday, January 2, 1960, John Fitzgerald Kennedy spoke in front of a 
crowded press conference declaring his candidacy for the presidency of the United 
States. Although Kennedy had been speaking for some time to audiences across the 
country under the assumption of his running in 1960, this was his first open 
declaration as a candidate and consequently it was critically important in setting the 
tone for the coming election. 
Just as had been foreseen at the meeting in Hyannis some months before, the 
main questions posed to him at that press conference concerned his age and his 
religion. It is not an issue of doubt whether or not Kennedy had built up for himself 
a first-rate staff of campaign ad visors. They were a capable group of men and their 
advice would serve him well throughout the campaign. But at this moment Kennedy 
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would stand alone and face the crowd. All the voters could see before them was the 
candidate and even though any presidency is a group effort, it would be upon their 
perceptions of that one candidate that voters would make their decision in the 
upcoming election. Whatever the work that goes into a campaign and as critical and 
necessary as it may be, it is the candidate who stands before the nation and faces the 
grueling ordeal of their decision. In this way, it really is a proving ground for 
elective office in the sense that any person who shows the stamina and the leadership 
to successfully carry himself through such a trial clearly possesses some of the 
attributes necessary to qualify him for political leadership. 
JFK on January 2, 1960 stood on the verge of a precipice the depth and size of 
which he could not possibly have known. Though he had faced campaigns before 
there can be nothing to compare with a campaign for the presidency of the United 
States, especially at this point in its history where the stakes for the future of the 
nation and the world in general were so high. This ceremony perhaps may have 
seemed to him something like the declaration of a suitor his intention to marry the 
prettiest and most wealthy girl in town and although Kennedy' s dedication to 
wedding vows has been openly questioned, it seems certain that he took this vow 
very seriously and was determined to win this girl's hand over her host of rival 
suitors. At least so it seemed in the forceful and forthright manner in which 
Kennedy made his entrance onto the presidential scene on that day in 1960. At his 
press conference Kennedy stressed two points. First, that he would not accept under 
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any circumstances the nomination of his party for the office of vice president. It was 
all or nothing at all. And second, he openly challenged his rival Democratic 
contenders to meet him on the campaign fields in the primaries; this issue could not 
properly be settled in the back room of the convention but only in open combat. At 
precisely 12: 30 pm as Kennedy walked to the podium to declare his candidacy, he 
stood for a moment and peered over the edge of that precipice. It would be for him 
either the beginning or the end, but if Kennedy was uncertain about his future, he 
did not show it. In the words of Ted Sorenson who was there to witness it: "He was 
not only crisp but confident."[18) 
The statement r egarding the position of vice president was a sensible one. If 
he did not rule out quickly the possibility of accepting the vice presidency, he would 
most certainly have been maneuvered into taking that position. His adversaries, 
despite his popularity, did not take his campaign very seriously. In their minds, the 
issue of religion was enough to disqualify him but on top of that Kennedy had almost 
no political clout. He was close to none of the big power brokers in Washington and 
did not enjoy the backing of any powerful figures in the Democratic Party. It was for 
this reason, beyond the more romantic one cited before, that Kennedy was pledging 
himself to fight in as many primaries as he possibly could. Only through 
incontrovertible public support could he hope to win the Democratic nomination. 
Consequently, because of the unlikely chances of a Catholic gaining so much popular 
support, many of Kennedy' s opponents thought they could bring him aboard their 
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ticket as a vice presidential nominee; a Catholic vice presidential nominee was 
generally thought to be a strength, while a Catholic heading the ticket was not only a 
weakness but was unthinkable. 
It is probably hard to imagine in this day and age, but the issue of Catholicism 
and democracy is a long and drawn-out one. Now, democracy tends to be seen in 
secular terms but for most of its history in modem Europe and North America it was 
decidedly a religious issue. Kennedy, of course, made the point that his private faith 
had no bearing on his public rights and duties. To the question posed to him at this 
press conference concerning his religion, Kennedy stated: 
I would think that there is really only one issue involved in the whole question ef a 
candidate's reliaion--that is, does a candidate believe in the Constitution, does he 
believe in the First Amendment, does he believe in the separation ef church and state. 
When the candidate aives his views on that question and I think I have Biven my views 
fully, I think the subject is exhausted.[ 19] 
His main argument focused on the issue of the separation of church and state which 
was a very clever way of framing the argument. 
The main rationale for the separation of church and state as it was 
incorporated into the Constitution was to keep religious authority from establishing 
itself in government. Just after the Revolution, there were a number of competing 
religions in the United States. Each was concerned that the other might seek to 
establish itself as the official religion in the new nation just as Anglicanism had 
established itself in England. The separation of church and state was, therefore, a 
guarantee of religious freedom, but it was a guarantee with a specific purpose in 
36 
Bryan Wuthrich 
Masters Thesis: The Kennedy Campaign of 1960 
mind and was consequently limited in scope as a protection of Protestant religious 
freedom. In the minds of most democratic thinkers both in the United States and in 
Europe, the concepts of political freedom were centered in their religious thoughts. 
A freeman was generally seen within the Protestant context as one free to 
contemplate his Lord God, Jesus Christ and by so doing to come upon Truth. 
Modern democracy was predominantly founded in the theological principle that each 
man is an individual and therefore capable of contemplating and understanding God 
without the interference of any earthly authority. 
The theology of Catholicism is directly counter to this and was therefore 
throughout democracy's early history in Western Europe and North America its 
most bitter opponent. The very principles that this nation was founded upon were 
largely in reaction to these hierarchical concepts of Catholic theology. 
Consequently, although the separation of church and state was most immediately 
concerned with maintaining a balance between Protestant faiths, its main goal, and 
one on which all the Protestant faiths could agree, was to prevent the consolidation 
of religious and political power which they all feared and which was always 
associated with Catholicism and Catholic beliefs. Democracy and Protestantism, 
except among the most radical of thinkers (who were either deists or irreligious and 
even they could agree that among Christian religions Catholicism was the worst), 
were synonymous. To the minds of most of the men who formulated the concepts 
of democracy both here and in Europe, the Catholic mind was simply incapable of 
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grasping the meaning of democracy as its very theology is counter to it [20]. Even as 
the fear of Catholicism diminished and Catholics became a significant portion of the 
American population, it was still widely believed that Catholics still had to be closely 
watched over lest their theological tendencies to submit unquestioningly to authority 
were to get the best of them and democracy become jeopardized. as mentioned 
before, Kennedy in framing the argument in this way as an issue of the separation of 
church and state was essentially using Protestant theology against itself. These 
attitudes toward Catholicism may seem decidedly nineteenth century but 
eventhough much had changed during the twentieth century these fundamental 
beliefs remained strong. 
In the aftermath of World War II, however, the Protestant principles which 
were for so long the foundation for this nation became more open to question. The 
greatest peril facing the principles of democracy and Protestantism was no longer 
Catholic absolutism, but rather communist totalitarianism. The challenge became to 
move the concept of freedom outside of its religious context and place it within a 
humanist one. It is fortunate that the Constitution was largely framed by some of the 
more radical American revolutionary leaders and that they were able to put within 
the Constitution a humanist language that, although probably not shared by most of 
their contemporaries, fit so well for the America of the Cold War period. It should 
be noted at the risk of repetition that this secular humanist concept of individuality 
and freedom was not a new one in the middle of the twentieth century. It had been 
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in currency in America for some two hundred years and there were strong humanist 
elements in Protestant theology and even in some Catholic ideology. Therefore it 
was not its novelty that made it noteworthy or even its common usage, but instead it 
is noteworthy because it became the centerpiece of how America represented itself 
in this era eclipsing other previously dominant themes. 
Kennedy at this time in 1960 was able therefore to bring up the persuasive 
argument that his personal beliefs concerning religion were of no consequence to his 
ability to run this nation and that his public life was separate from his private beliefs. 
It is not that those Protestants who thought twice about a Catholic running a nation 
which they thought to be a product of their Protestant heritage were right or wrong 
about their convictions, but instead that this concern was quickly becoming 
irrelevant and if Protestant Americans were not able to move beyond it they were in 
danger of becoming obsolete--the fate of the British Empire could not have been far 
from their minds and have given them serious pause over any old concepts of 
Anglo-Protestant superiority they still entertained. Kennedy knew that democracy 
to be successful in the new Cold War period in a world that was predominantly 
non-Christian would have to be formulated on secular grounds disregarding religious 
concerns. The irony of this situation was that even as the Cold War became a 
struggle against the "Godless" communists by the "God fearing'' people of the free 
world, this could only be achieved by watering down the concept of God so that it 
39 
Bryan Wuthrich 
Masters Thesis: The Kennedy Campaign of 1960 
could embrace all faiths and function largely as a symbol in an increasingly secular 
environment. 
It is interesting to note as an aside how this development would create 
something of a dilemma within the modern presidency. Ultimately, Kennedy' s 
argument would have to rest on a premise of expediency with respect to the 
workings of government; that the real test of a man's worthiness to hold public 
office was to be found in his ability to perform his tasks and not in his private 
convictions. Kennedy often stated that he maintained the principles of his Catholic 
faith and still took them seriously. If this were true than he would have to look upon 
the position of the presidency as a job, a very important one no doubt but 
nevertheless a job, one that he wanted and felt he was no less qualified for than 
anyone else but one with no decisive bearing on any eternal issues. Within that 
context, his performance in the job could only be judged by success or failure based 
on temporal and shifting issues; overarching moral issues tend to be obscured or 
become deceptive. The premise of secular humanism was for Kennedy as perplexing 
as it was for Protestants since, although sensible, it is in fact irreconcilable with all 
traditional forms of Christianity. Pure secular humanism is an ancient philosophy 
which owes its foundation to a form of thought that is diametrically opposed to the 
concept of religion, unless of course religion is so watered down that it becomes 
completely innocuous and interchangeable one for the other, and rests upon the 
precept that the dignity of man is self-generated. It places man at the center of all 
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things. One does not doubt that Kennedy was true to his word when he pledged his 
belief in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the separation of church and state 
but his motive in doing so would have to be, barring a complete duplicity on his 
avowed maintenance of his faith, one based solely on expedience and not on any true 
belief since without the investment of Divine inspiration into the British 
parliamentary style of government that most dominant Protestant faiths worked into 
their theology or the central belief in the sanctity of human ideas prevalent in 
humanism, these documents become nothing more than negotiable codes of 
behavior. 
None of these principles are at all sacrosanct within the context of Catholic 
theology and therefore on a moral plain they become deceptive--i.e. Kennedy 
pledges his support for the Constitution and swears to uphold it not because he really 
believes in it, at least not in the manner many Protestants had been raised to believe 
in it or humanists have chosen to believe in it, but rather because it would be foolish 
not to. The Constitution is protected by him, true, but only as a necessary and 
convenient tool of government and in this sense it becomes an expedient and a 
somewhat morally compromised document. It is probable that Kennedy did not 
unduly tax himself over this issue as he campaigned for the presidency thinking 
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Nor is it true that these problems arose with Kennedy; they were in the 
making for some time but the Cold War served as a means to push the process 
forward and ultimately sever American government from its Protestant assumptions 
of the nineteenth century. At the time of Theodore Roosevelt, a president could 
believe confidently that his faith and his role as president were singular and that, in 
fact, the very workings of government itself were somehow evidence of God's plan 
made manifest on earth and he as president was acting on God's behalf. This form of 
Protestant Progressivism was dominant in America all through the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries and John Foster Dulles in the Eisenhower administration 
was a remaining vestige of this belief during the 1950s. All the presidents up to 
Herbert Hoover with few notable exceptions are fairly easy to understand because of 
this ready association of God in their public life. By 1960, with John F. Kennedy it 
seemed that God and morality would become more private concerns and the 
activities of the president would be judged primarily on strictly legal terms. 
Leaving aside the persuasiveness of his argument that he was a private citizen 
pursuing his lawfully guaranteed rights as a citizen, Kennedy left the podium that day 
in Washington with his audience still unconvinced. As is so often the case, 
Americans were to make their decision based more on the passionate exchanges on 
the campaign trail and less on the strength of the candidate's logic. The course of 
the campaign over the ensuing nine months would provide Kennedy the opportunity 
to prove to the American public that a young and Catholic man had the capacity and 
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the right to be president. Kennedy's opponents, however, were even more doubtful 
of the chances for a successful Kennedy campaign. Only the dark horse candidate, 
Hubert Humphrey, was pledged to go out and enter the primaries against Kennedy. 
Stuart Symington, the senator from Missouri, and Lyndon Johnson, the Senate 
Majority leader from Texas, both thought it wise to sit out the primaries and take the 
nomination in what they thought was sure to be a deadlocked convention in Los 
Angeles. Adlai Stevenson, the two-time Democratic nominee, awaited a draft 
Stevenson movement to ride him into his third nomination. 
Wisconsin 
The first test would be the Wisconsin primary on April 15. Wisconsin 
bordered Humphrey's home state of Minnesota and would be a crucial victory to 
show Kennedy's strength outside the Northeast. Also, Wisconsin provided a 
favorable balance with which Kennedy could test his appeal among rural Protestant 
Americans. There is in Wisconsin a sizable rural population yet it has as well in 
Milwaukee and Madison a substantial urban population. Also with a Catholic 
population of between 30 and 40 percent, Wisconsin could provide for Kennedy a 
nice challenge in his vote-getting appeal among Protestants while still being able to 
rely upon a safe cushion of Catholic support. Kennedy and his staff knew that, on the 
one hand, a defeat in Wisconsin would be the end of his campaign but, on the other 
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hand, a significant victory could wrap up the nomination. Consequently, Kennedy 
and his team pulled out all the stops for a decisive victory over Humphrey. 
It is interesting to note, as a contrast, how Humphrey saw this campaign 
against Kennedy and what he thought the election of 1960 was all about. Humphrey 
was a well respected senator from Minnesota and had built a strong reputation for 
himself as a fervent supporter of liberal ideals in the Democratic Party; he was firmly 
behind the cause of civil rights long before Kennedy was, for example. Humphrey's 
rise to political power was in many ways a confirmation of the populist ideals that 
had long been the foundation of the Democratic Party but in the era big business and 
big labor had fallen somewhat by the wayside. Humphrey was very much a man of 
the people and tried wherever possible to cast himself as being one of them, which to 
a large degree was completely natural because he really was. His language was plain 
and although Humphrey's candor was refreshing in comparison to Kennedy's, 
chronicler of the 1960 campaign Theodore White was quite right in pointing out the 
dubious nature of the sobriquet "man of the people" in presidential politics: 
Humphrey was "someone just like the listeners" but "a President, unfortunately for 
Humphrey, must be different from everyone else. "[21] 
In a speech to a Jewish group in Milwaukee, Humphrey summed up his views 
on liberalism and the Cold War: 
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We believe liberalism is more than intellectual capacity--intellectual liberalism must be 
buttressed with an understandin9 ef people and a love ef them that 9oes Jar beyond texts 
or documents. For if you can't cry a little bit in politics, the only other thin9you'11 
have is hate. 
It is difficult to imagine Kennedy crying at all let alone crying in a political situation. 
Humphrey goes on: 
The real contest in this world is not a military one; our real competition with the 
Soviet Union is not an economic one ... lt is a coriflict over a system ef values ... To elect a 
President it's more important that he be 9ood ef heart, 9ood ef spirit, than that he be 
slick, or clever, or statesmanlike-lookin9. To be a leader means a willin9ness to 
risk--and a willin9ness to love. Has the leader 9iven you somethin9 directly from his 
heart? Or has it all been planned in advance, all been scheduled? Is it efficient? !J you 
want efficiency in politics, you can 90 to the communists or totalitarians. I believe 
politics is simply to deal with people and to be human. Every now and then I read in 
the paper how disorderly Hubert Humphrey's campai9n is and I say, THANK GOD. 
[22] 
Humphrey uses the word liberalism but what he really seems to be referring to is 
populism. These terms are often used interchangeably and like the terms liberal and 
conservative are difficult to pin down over various historical eras. However, it could 
be said that liberalism from its origins in the Enlightenment period had always been 
something of an elitist and intellectual term, while the words Humphrey uses here 
really are more apropos of Populism as it originated in the American Midwest during 
the later half of the nineteenth century--one has to wonder whether Humphrey is just 
inadvertently mixing his terminology or whether, perhaps, he was just reticent to use 
45 
Bryan Wuthrich 
Masters Thesis: The Kennedy Campaign of 1960 
so late in the twentieth century the word populism. Whatever terms one chooses to 
use in describing this form of rhetoric, it would take the Vietnam war and W atergate 
to make humility an appealing trait in a presidential candidate and then only for 
Jimmy Carter in 1976 and not for Jimmy Carter in 1980. 
Here in these brief statements we can see how Humphrey tried to stack up 
what were his strengths against what he saw as Kennedy' s weaknesses, his open 
candor and his love for the people against Kennedy' s clever wit, regal style, and 
money. Throughout the Wisconsin campaign Humphrey talked about saving the 
disappearing small business man and farmer and preserving the vital force in 
American culture that they represent while Kennedy would go on about statistics and 
the coming of a new era, almost eager to leave the old one behind. In this day of 
corporate farms and Super Walmarts reading Humphrey's words makes them seem 
both more prophetic and more sad. Humphrey, himself, said at one point that he felt 
like "a corner grocer running against a chain store." [23) It seems Americans have 
made their decision and voted for efficiency and style and listening to Humphrey, 
one has to wonder if they made the right choice. 
Of Wisconsin's thirty-one delegates, ten were chosen on a state wide 
winner -takes-all basis, twenty were chosen, two each, from the state's ten 
Congressional districts, and the remaining vote was split between the national 
committeeman and committeewoman. Crossover voting was allowed between the 
Republicans and Democrats. 
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Lou Harris conducted a poll for the Kennedy campaign of some twenty-three 
thousand voters in Wisconsin. At that time the biggest campaign poll ever taken 
within a state, the poll showed Kennedy' s weak areas in the third, the ninth, and the 
tenth districts bordering on Minnesota (which were also heavily Protestant) and what 
would be for Kennedy the crucial religiously mixed districts of the first and second 
districts. 
Both candidates spent about the same amount of money in Wisconsin, some 
$150,000 [24), but Humphrey's Minnesota team of volunteers were part time and 
were only available on weekends while Kennedy' s staff was full time and was also 
able to open up headquarters in each congressional district while. Humphrey was 
limited to Madison and Milwaukee. Humphrey relied mainly on the clout he was 
able to establish for himself over the years in the Wisconsin State Democratic 
Organization. 
In addition to his staff, which with the exception of Ted Sorensen, had all 
moved to Wisconsin for the primary, there was of course the Kennedy family. The 
Kennedy family stumped tirelessly throughout Wisconsin and many Wisconsiners 
were often confused into thinking that one of the Kennedy brothers to whom they 
were listening was actually JFK, when it was, in reality, either Robert or Teddy and 
JFK was speaking miles away. These reports would get back to Humphrey and cause 
him much consternation as JFK seemed to be everywhere simultaneously and he, 
being a mere mortal, could only be in one place at any given time. [25] 
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The press was also much impressed with the Kennedy campaign organization 
and, setting the precedent for a phenomenon which would reoccur throughout the 
coming months of the campaign, began to favor him. Reports began to circulate that 
Kennedy would sweep all of Wisconsin's ten congressional districts and that, at least, 
a significant Kennedy victory was certain. [26] This effect of the Kennedy campaign 
in biasing the news media was subtle and no doubt was the result more of an 
unconscious rather than conscious and deliberate decisions on the part of the press. 
All news media are careful to maintain the appearance of objectivity in their 
coverage of the candidates; to appear obviously biased is simply embarrassing for any 
mainstream reporter and news outlet. Bias in the print media more often takes the 
form of the quantity and the quality of the press coverage. For instance, the national 
magazine U.S. News and World Report ran a full-length cover story on the Kennedy 
election team by reporter Ben Bradley. Here in particular the quality of the coverage 
comes across. In describing that October, 1959, first meeting of the Kennedy 
election team discussed earlier, Bradley brought out all the various personalities. 
We learn the names of the staff members and family members. Bradley described a 
collegial and friendly atmosphere "Distant from the smoke filled rooms of a political 
convention."[27] To be fair to Bradley and the other reporters, the Kennedy staff 
were really a journalist's dream. They were all engaging with interesting 
backgrounds and of course there is the tremendous human interest aspect of the 
Kennedy family--it all made for simply fabulous copy that probably wrote itself. 
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Nonetheless, the type of words Bradley chose to use were very evocative and 
reflective of general trends in the manner in which Kennedy was approached by the 
media. Bradley wrote: "Shrewd judgment, boyish charm, plenty of money--all of 
these have played their part in bringing John Kennedy close to the Democratic 
nomination"(28] This particular article was written after the Wisconsin primary but 
there is evident in it some of the buzz words and catch phrases that were circulating 
around Kennedy. Reporters tend to use each others wor ds in their copy; the proof 
of this is that thirty years later these same words are just as likely to be used by a 
journalist in reference to Kennedy as they were then by Bradley--they have become 
convenient copy or Kennedy cliches. 
Sometimes it is not even the words alone but mere word order that can also 
reflect bias. A reporter less favorable to Kennedy could have easily written the same 
lines using the same words and made it less positive by simply inverting the order of 
the words and starting the sentence with "lots of money." As it is now the money is 
just the icing on the cake. The delicate issue of Kennedy' s father was also 
sidestepped by Bradley, In general throughout the media, potential problem topics 
for the Kennedy campaign (outside of his youth and religion and those more often 
than not were either neutralized by being labeled as illegitimate criticisms or turned 
into positives by stressing his "boyish charm" or the importance of tolerance as a 
virtue) seemed to be glossed over. 
49 
Bryan Wuthrich 
Masters Thesis: The Kennedy Campaign of 1960 
There are a number of other subtle ways that journalistic copy can reflect 
bias. Bradley goes on in this particular article about the Kennedy campaign team to 
describe the staff as "a big, smooth, hard-hitting political organization."[29] Again by 
the time this article was written, June 27, 1960, this had become a very familiar tag 
placed on the Kennedy election team and even during the Wisconsin primary local 
reporters were frequently referring to Kennedy' s campaign as a "huge, smooth 
running"[30] organization. Humphrey tried during the Wisconsin campaign to turn 
that tag to his favor by making Kennedy ' s efficiency seem sinister and "all planned 
out" but it was to no avail. In the consumer culture that we had become by the 
beginning of the sixties efficiency and power were dominant themes over lovability 
and folksiness. Actually, Bradley's copy sounds very much like advertising copy. If 
one were to change the final two words of his sentence, for instance, from "political 
organization" to "luxury-performance car," there would be evident the familiar 
phrasing of an automobile advertisement. In that line of thinking, would any 
consumer choose a familiar but inefficient car over a "big, smooth, hard hitting" one? 
Simply put, the Kennedy campaign was able to fashion around Kennedy the 
aura of a winner which consequently gave his words more impact and made them 
more interesting to the reporters who covered them than did the words of 
Humphrey. The Kennedy campaign was able to exploit to a new level of efficiency 
the old adage: it is not so much what you say as how you say it. To this could also 
be added the importance of who says it. Reporters need interesting stories about 
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interesting people and in the press what makes a subject interesting is how it is 
presented and who presents it; in what was at the time the rapidly growing field of 
television this, of course, became an even more important factor raising the 
significance of who was talking to still higher levels of importance. 
The Kennedy campaign was also very much aware of the reporters following 
their campaign as human beings and often went out of its way to cater to their needs. 
Humphrey's campaign was not indifferent to the importance of reporters but they, as 
was traditional in political campaigning at the time, sought more the approval of the 
editors and looked on the reporters as simply a conduit to the masses whose personal 
favor was not in need of being won over. Kennedy and his campaign staff sought as 
much as possible to include the reporters covering them into their campaign and 
eventually had the effect of psychologically bringing them on board as if they were 
part of the campaign. This was a tremendous advantage and would pay even greater 
dividends in the coming campaign against Richard Nixon. 
As far as an awareness of the crucial role of the media in campaign strategy 
Wisconsin was just the beginning in a Kennedy campaign that would set the trend for 
what would become standard media practices. The Kennedy staff tried whenever 
possible to bring the immediacy of their candidate to the American people believing 
the personal charisma of Kennedy was one of his main attributes. With this in mind, 
they arranged for a two-channel telephone car to be placed in all motorcades directly 
behind the candidate allowing reporters to file running accounts to their offices of 
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the receptions the candidate was receiving while the parades were in progress [31] 
Actually, this is a brilliant idea beyond the level of its technical efficiency because 
reports written in the midst of a crowd frenzy are more likely to reflect the emotion 
of the event than if they are written later in the quiet of a hotel room or office. 
The Kennedy staff also worked up what was at that time the technical and 
administrative innovation of the instant transcript. At each and every speech, a 
Kennedy staff er would perch himself somewhere in the audience, often times in 
precarious situations, with his stenograph machine and take down, word for word, 
Kennedy's speeches and remarks. He would, as he was in progress, pass over his 
notations to fellow staffers who would ferry them immediately over to some 
temporary location where they had installed a mimeograph machine. The transcripts 
were then copied, collated, and distributed to the press. All of this was part and 
parcel of what chief Kennedy Press Secretary, Pierre Salinger, called their 
overarching strategy of making the job of the press as easy as possible.[32] In this 
case, providing transcripts for the press was an effective weapon in that strategy . 
Having ready-made transcripts available freed the individual reporters to take in the 
atmosphere of a Kennedy rally and to be caught up in the emotions of the crowd. It 
also endeared Kennedy to the reporters since it liberated them from yet another 
chore of their profession and it is certain that more than one unfortunate, or perhaps 
delinquent, reporter relied on those transcripts to file a report on a speech which he 
was not in attendance to hear. But perhaps even more importantly it ensured that 
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the off the cuff remarks which made Kennedy' s speeches so engaging to the audience 
were also included in the printed press reports read by millions of other Americans 
thereby allowing, in some small way, the print media to capture that same sense of 
spontaneity which Kennedy was so successfully able to get across in the broadcast 
media. 
The degree of media savviness in the Kennedy campaign was truly a first in 
American politics. They paid attention to and were familiar with every aspect of the 
media process in news gathering and news reporting. The Kennedy staff were often 
ahead of their time when it came to media techniques and, for example, actually 
made arrangements for all of Kennedy' s major rallies to be recorded by the nascent 
mobile video tape units. Much of this can be attributed to Kennedy himself who was 
at one time a reporter. He seemed to be genuinely fascinated with media and how it 
worked. He was a voracious consumer of the media and was frequently known to 
personally call up astonished journalists, even after he became president, to make 
comments on their stories. He was also extremely conscious of his image and how it 
was portrayed in the media and would constantly seek feedback from his staff 
members about how he looked and how he sounded. 
More, importantly, however, he seemed to sincerely like reporters and the 
jobs they were doing. He made numerous friends in the press corps and was always 
sure to make himself available to them. According to Ben Bradley, who would go on 
to become the editor of the Washington Post and one of the key men in uncovering 
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the Watergate conspiracy under Nixon, Kennedy's door was always open to the 
various reporters who wanted to see him on any given day. Kennedy was personable 
and was able to play the role of gracious dignitary giving an all access pass to the 
often star struck reporters. His remarks to them usually had an air of spontaneity 
giving each reporter the impression that he was gaining valuable insight into Kennedy 
the man. Bradley describes the relationship between the press and Kennedy as being 
an "elaborate mating dance" [33] that would ultimately blossom into a full-blown 
love affair. It is interesting how unapologetic Bradley is about his bias towards 
Kennedy. He openly admits to his preferences and even how they affected his copy 
and yet feels completely justified in the sense that he truly believes that later on in 
the general elections Kennedy was deserving of his support and that Nixon was not. 
Implicitly, to the mind of Bradley the nation was better served by this editorial and 
opinion-shaping aspect of the press allowing its slight bias to taint its coverage of 
these two men. The simple fact of the matter was that to Bradley and many of his 
fellow reporters as well Kennedy would make a better president. 
Despite the positive coverage in the press, however, the Kennedy campaign 
did not achieve a decisive victory in Wisconsin and although they won with a 
majority of 56% of the vote, they lost all of the predominantly Protestant border 
districts; the third, the ninth, and the tenth districts. Humphrey also won the mixed 
second district and Kennedy won by only the narrowest of margins the other mixed 
district, the seventh. Kennedy carried all the predominantly Catholic and urban 
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districts giving him six to Humphrey's four districts. One of the Kennedy sisters, 
somewhat confused over her brother's lack of enthusiasm for his victory, asked him: 
"What does it mean?" Kennedy replied: "It means that we have to do it all over 
again. We have to go through every one and win every one of them--West Virginia, 
Nebraska, Maryland, Indiana, Oregon, all the way to the convention." [34] 
The Kennedy campaign in Wisconsin was anything but conclusive on his 
ability to be the next president but it was, however, completely conclusive that 
Humphrey could not be the next president. Claiming what he perceived as a moral 
victory over Kennedy in Wisconsin, Humphrey, upon hearing the returns, 
euphorically pledged to the press that he would go on and fight him in West Virginia. 
Whatever Humphrey's personal reasons for continuing his campaign, it was clear 
that if he could not carry his own border state then he had no chance to win the 
election and that his continued campaigning activity had the appearance of being a 
pawn in the campaigns of others anxious to derail the Kennedy campaign. The fact 
that it was later learned that Humphrey's campaign in West Virginia was largely 
financed by Stevenson supporters [35] made it even more suspicious. Kennedy was, 
of course, furious that Humphrey planned to oppose him in West Virginia even 
though earlier in the race a Lou Harris poll had shown Kennedy with a substantial 
lead and the campaign staff had once hoped to "trap" Humphrey there. After 
Wisconsin, however, Kennedy was anxious to lock up the primaries and had grown 
irritated with what appeared to him to be a stop Kennedy movement. 
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Things quickly went from bad to worse when soon after the staff arrived in 
West Virginia they learned that the earlier Harris poll showing Kennedy with a 
comfortable G0-40 lead was misleading. The poll was conducted some tjme before 
the campaign season had begun and apparently without any of the subjects realizing 
that Kennedy was Catholic. When, after the hard fought Wisconsin primary, the 
religious issue was brought to the fore and it came to the attention of the West 
Virginia voters that Kennedy was Catholic, the margin there completely reversed 
itself. The new circumstances facing the Kennedy staff were 60-40 for Humphrey. 
Things looked very gloomy as the Kem~edy campaign set to work on West Virginia 
and it appeared very likely that they ,.,.·ere about to lose and thereby throw open the 
convention to what would be almost sure defeat. As it turned out, however, the 
over 90% Protestant make up of West Virginia wo-:.1ld provide Kennedy with a 
conclusive victory over the religious issue, at least as far as the Democratic 
nomination was concerned, and would essentially lock up the nomination. Like the 
Democratic convention of 1956, the events leading up to the West Virginia primary 
were for Kennedy a series of blessings in disguise. 
\Vest Virginia 
Among some of the advantages that the Kennedy campaign had at its disposal 
was its resourcefol staff, an army of over nine thousand campaign volunteers, and the 
abilities of the candidate himself--not to mention the added confidence that an almost 
56 
Bryan Wuthrich 
Masters Thesis: The Kennedy Campaign of 1960 
unlimited resource of funding can bring to a campaign staff, even if as it turns out 
they did not greatly out spend Humphrey. All these forces were set into motion to 
help· turn the tide for the Kennedy organization. Also, it must be said, there were at 
their disposal in West Virginia some illicit and decidedly below the board advantages 
as well. 
West Virginia was known at the time to be one of the most corrupt states in 
the union. Poverty was of course rampant throughout the state and would go on to 
be a major campaign issue of the primary. It had been a tradition of long standing 
that politicians and government employees in West Virginia would supplement their 
meager wages during elections with contributions that were generally regarded as 
fees for services provided. Most often the service provided involved placement in 
the complicated slate system by which candidates names were organized and 
presented to the voter. Voters would vote for an entire slate and inclusion on a well 
known slate was critical for any potential candidate, even a presidential one. As a 
show of good faith, contributions were often expected by the local parties for 
inclusion on their slate. [36) It also has become evident by the release of certain FBI 
wiretaps done at the time that large amounts of Mafia donations were made to the 
Kennedy campaign and were fmding their way to W est Virginia--Kennedy had just 
before the West Virginia primary made the acquaintance of mob boss Sam Giancana 
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Although these activities do not seem to be widespread enough to indicate 
that Kennedy bought the election (according to the Charleston Gazette which put 
two of its best reporters on the case to see if that was in fact what happened, 
"Kennedy did not buy that election. He sold himself to the voters."), they are 
nonetheless unsavory and do not reflect well on Kennedy. In his defense, however, 
the journalist Theodore White has argued that corruption was simply a rule of the 
game in West Virginia. [38) Also, it should be noted that West Virginia provided 
clear evidence of prejudice against Kennedy as the quick turn-around in the polls 
showed; Kennedy was losing people's votes in an unfair manner so it probably 
seemed less wrong to him and his staff that he should win them back, at least 
partially, in an equally unfair manner. In that desperate struggle any and every 
advantage had to be utilized, or at least so it would have seemed to the Kennedy 
campaign. 
Humphrey, himself, was no stranger to this fact as it seems to have played a 
role in his choice of music for his campaign song--choosing the tune of"Give Me that 
Old Time Religion" could hardly have been a coincidence. As the campaign 
progressed Humphrey would attack Kennedy and the Kennedy campaign with 
increasing vehemence, at one point saying publicly that "Kennedy is the spoiled 
candidate and he and that young, emotional, juvenile Bobby are spending money 
with wild abandon."(39] Kennedy, himself, tried as was his custom to remain above 
the fray but it seems more than likely that he gave his tacit approval to allow a rather 
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unfair remark to be made about Humphrey by Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., who was 
campaigning for Kennedy in West Virginia, concerning Humphrey's lack of military 
service in W. W .II. The remark was quickly disowned by Kennedy but only after the 
damage had already been done. By all accounts, the West Virginia campaign was a 
hard fought no-holds-barred battle by both candidates. 
The addition of FDR Jr. to the campaign was a defmite stroke of genius and 
seems to have been the work of father Joseph. FDR senior was nearly a deity among 
the West Virginians who remember fondly his help during their plight of the 
depression years. In an exercise of pure irony FDR Jr. campaigned throughout the 
state holding his two entwined fingers before the crowd saying "my daddy and 
Kennedy's daddy were like this." Letters were also post marked from Hyde Park, 
NY, giving support for the Kennedy candidacy signed FDR, as if the old man had 
risen from the grave to put his name behind Kennedy. This situation was made even 
stranger by the fact that Eleanor Roosevelt was deliberately withholding her support 
for Kennedy. Saying she was unimpressed by Kennedy's stand on the McCarthy 
issue--Kennedy did not vote to censure McCarthy, who was a family friend, claiming 
he was in the hospital at the time when in truth he could have easily voted by 
proxy--Mrs. Roosevelt had refused to support Kennedy. She was also concerned 
that Kennedy had never dealt satisfactorily with the issue of his Catholicism. [40] 
The issue of religion was, of course, the main issue of the campaign in West 
Virginia and Mrs. Roosevelt's remarks concerning the manner in which Kennedy 
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handled the issue have some pertinence. The truth is that, while Kennedy was very 
brave in tackling the issue, he never really dealt squarely with the complexities of 
the matter. His tactic, knowingly or unknowingly, was to completely delegitimizc 
the issue. He never once dealt with the real differences of opinion concerning the 
role of the state and religion that are fundamental to the theology of Catholicism and 
Protestantism. Instead he cleverly defused the issue, and actually turned it to his 
advantage as discussed before, by making it an issue of tolerance and the separation 
of church and state. Framing his argument in this manner, it is not Catholic 
tolerance that falls into question but Protestant tolerance. By framing the argument 
in this highly charged emotional atmosphere and often boldly pronouncing that no 
one asked him what religion he was when he was given command of a PT boat in the 
Pacific or what religion his brother was when he died fighting for this country over 
Europe, issues of substance became distorted. 
It cannot be said that Kennedy was to blame for this or that he was 
deliberately trying to put one over on the Protestants. He was only trying to get 
elected. Instead, the very means by which this discussion was to be carried almost 
necessitated or ordained this type of approach. Presenting one's arguments to a large 
crowd either directly or, as is more often the case, through the medium of radio or 
television does not allow a full discussion of the facts and issues at hand. Holding the 
attention of a large audience is no easy matter requiring large amounts of 
simplification (in the case of radio or television time is even more restricted and 
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simplification even greater). Facts become less the issue and appearances 
preeminent. An issue has to be boiled down to one easily identifiable and easily 
circulated aspect. More often than not that aspect has to carry with it some 
emotional value that somehow fits in with the mood of the times. Tolerance by the 
1960 campaign was the most convenient and usable aspect of the religious issue that 
the Kennedy staff had at its disposal and it was one that fit in nicely with the mood of 
the times. Tolerance is a worthwhile ideal if it involves a genuine understanding of 
the issues that separate any two communities. It can lead to deeper understanding of 
the prevalent ties of commonality between them and allow them to see beyond what 
they understand to be, in truth, petty differences. At the very least, in the case when 
those differences are real and insurmountable tolerance can lead to recognition of the 
intractable nature of the dispute and the two parties can agree to coexist with one 
another and agree to disagree. Tolerance as it was dealt with in the West Virginia 
primary was really a far less substantial form of understanding, however, and came in 
the end just to be the absence or denial of intolerance. 
The traditional arguments against Catholicism that most Protestants, 
particularly in the poor and less sophisticated country of West Virginia, tended to 
latch onto were the simple and most basic elements that separated the two faiths. 
More prominent and better educated Protestants could no doubt frame the 
arguments in a more sophisticated manner, but to the poor West Virginian farmer 
who spent most of his time tending to his meager fields in a tenuous struggle for 
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survival, the argument would more than likely appear to him like it did to this man: 
"People here aren't anti-Kennedy. They are simply concerned about the domination 
of the Catholic church." [41] Or, the argument may have appeared as it did to one 
West Virginian woman who said that she did not see anything wrong with being a 
Catholic, necessarily, but if you are going to be a Catholic you should be a good one 
and not believe in the separation of church and state. 
Leaders in the Protestant community were defmitely put in a bind by the 
candidacy of Kennedy. Listening to their poorer brethren they must have recognized 
the essence of their Protestant faith as they have worked over generations to 
formulate it here in the United States which for so long had been looked upon as 
their Protestant promised land. Now many of them were forced to deny it. Many 
Protestant ministers railed publicly and in their sermons about the evils of a Catholic 
presidency and Kennedy's effort to circulate an open letter through the community 
of Protestant leaders calling for religious tolerance produced only thirteen 
signatures--Billy Graham, pastor to numerous presidents, refused to sign and in a 
later sermon stated that religion would definitely be a major and legitimate issue 
"whether we like it or not." [42] Even the signatories to the open letter calling for 
religious tolerance in the election found it necessary to preface it by stating their 
continued opposition to the Roman Church. Given the political climate, however, 
most Protestants could see that some compromise would have to be made and sought 
to do it in some favorable manner. The ministers who signed the petition were 
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praised in the media for their tolerance, but the media, more an institution whose 
business it is not to offend and whose purpose is largely to advertise to as wide an 
audience as possible, have no overarching beliefs to defend and nothing to which they 
must remain consistent. Unfortunately for most Protestants, their very name 
imphes opposition to Catholicism and the presidency was often looked upon as the 
very embodiment of their ideals and faith; these types of beliefs are very deep seeded 
and are beyond the scope of simple reason. Tolerance is one value but consistency, 
heritage, and fidelity are also values. The problem was that while Billy Graham may 
have been able to artfully defend his position, the average Protestant who was 
confronted with this dilemma did so with solidity and simplicity of argument that 
could easily be construed as being bigoted. According to one woman who was 
perplexed by this issue, "we have enough trouble in West Virginia let alone to be 
called bigots too." [43) 
A very complex and long standing difference of opinion between the Catholic 
church in Rome and various Protestant churches, was boiling down in West Virginia 
to a question of appearances. It simply did not look good to seem bigoted and here 
was an opportunity presented by the Kennedy campaign for good West Virginians to 
show the world that they were open minded and fair. In the tradition of many great 
ad campaigns, the Kennedy campaign was appealing to the vanity of the voter. 
Leaving aside its moral dimensions, tolerance in the Kennedy campaign in West 
Virginia, and later in his fight against Richard Nixon, was the next must-have 
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commodity that all Americans should have and he was offering it at bargain rates: 
after all it is much easier to show one's tolerance by supporting a handsome Catholic 
than it is to support other, more demanding and less appealing, causes. 
In many respects, the success of the Kennedy campaign concerning the 
religious issue was really in removing the whole issue of religion out of the frame of 
the debate and thus it marks a milestone in the pushing of religion to the margins of 
American society. In fact, in looking over the various national magazines from the 
period it is possible to see how much things have changed since then. Religion, and 
of course particularly the Protestant religion, was frequently included as an integral 
aspect of U. S. policy debate, both foreign and domestic. Protestant ministers were 
frequently quoted in news articles on a variety of subjects. The cause of the United 
States as leader of the free world was so intertwined in the minds of many Americans 
with the principles of their Protestant faith as a product of their upbringing that a 
prominent Protestant, J. Howard Pew, would feel perfectly comfortable to state in 
a U.S. News and World Report article about the role of religion in America's civic 
and foreign affairs that "freedom can only exist where people accept Christianity." 
[44] The article from which this quote is taken is of broader interest because it 
represents what could be described as a liberal Protestant viewpoint which was 
coming to the fore amidst the general unrest of the Cold War and, in particular, 
amidst the furor of a potential Catholic president. It was written in contrast to other 
Protestants who saw political debate and world affairs in strictly religious terms. Its 
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philosophic nature concerning the role of Protestantism in American society neatly 
lays out the traditional Protestant theological principles worked into American 
government and culture that were prevalent among both liberal and conservative 
Protestants at the time the election. Pew writes 
Our Foundin9 Fathers were a stron9ly reli9ious people over 60 per cent ef them bein9 ef 
Calvinistic stock ... They reco9nized that some 9ovemment was necessary if order was to 
be maintained, but they were also convinced that the more divine authority the people 
would accept as rule for their conduct, the less 9ovemmental authority would be 
necessary. And so they set up a pattern to live by, in which Christianity, morality, self 
discipline, freedom and limited 9overnment all played an important part. [45 J 
Pew goes on to quote a United Presbyterian clergyman arguing that the 
United Presbyterian Church should not speak out definitively on political matters 
because that was "essentially the Roman Catholic view."[46] Even though Pew 
argues for less open involvement of the Church in political affairs, he does so by first 
asserting that political affairs in the United States were themselves essentially molded 
by religious concerns. While on the surface Pew is trying to display his modern 
liberal, pseudo-secular humanist, viewpoint by arguing that the state of human affairs 
in the twentieth century is too complex to be looked at through the prism of 
religious beliefs, he is at the same time cleverly underlining the basic Protestant 
nature of American civilization by stressing the fact that the separation of church and 
state fundamental to its constitution was done by religious minded men not to 
preserve the sanctity of the state but rather to preserve the sanctity of their 
Protestant faith and that freedom is a Christian and implicitly Protestant concept. 
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Consequently, Pew argues that Protestant Americans should welcome the possibility 
of a Catholic president because, first of all, America is so fundamentally Protestant in 
its composition that it has nothing to fear, and, second, because to do otherwise 
would be essentially Catholic. Here we have nicely spelled out the strategy of 
tactical retreat carried out by liberal Protestants during the Kennedy campaign. 
They were hoping to making concessions in order to preserve the predominantly 
Protestant make-up of American society; or, in the words of Pew, that the righteous 
and dominant cause of Protestantism in American society will best be served by 
"moral suasion" and not the "commands" of the state. Unfortunately, by bowing out 
gracefully Protestantism in America was not able maintain its moral sway over 
America. American government has become anything but limited and its role, along 
with that of the media, as a source of secularism in American culture has eclipsed the 
dominant position once held by religion and Protestantism. While still undisputedly 
a force, it has nonetheless become a marginal force and early forty years later, it 
would seem highly out of place for a mainstream national news magazine to quote 
religious authorities in the context of U.S. foreign policy. 
As Americans were increasingly challenged to see beyond the parameters of 
their religious upbringing, they ultimately came to see themselves on more secular 
terms. The media and in particular television had long been presenting an image of 
American life outside the confmes of religion. Images had to be universal and a 
secular lifestyle is much more acceptable to the broad spectrum of the American 
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public. Consequently in the visions of American life that became so prevalent and 
powerful during the 1950s and were presented to the American public via TV, 
religion was almost completely absent--we have no idea what sort of religion Lucy 
and Ricky Ricardo practiced, or the Cleavers, or Donna Reed's TV family. The 
media in general and TV in particular require that conflict be minimized and 
whatever conflict that is to arise be presented in a manner that can be resolved. On 
TV, therefore, in dramas and comedies we are presented with a world without 
fundamental principles and subsequently without any basis for profound conflict. 
The manner in which the religious issue was handled during the Kennedy campaign 
mirrored this trend and tolerance was largely viewed with respect to appearances by 
the abandonment of sources of conflict. 
Appearances in general proved an insurmountable obstacle for Humphrey as 
he just did not seem to be a winner. In the fmal days of the campaign, he and his staff 
made an all out push to "go over the hump with Humphrey.,, A debate with 
Kennedy was scheduled but since the two had no real substantive differences it 
proved completely inconsequential. Kennedy was able to show his mastery of TV's 
visual medium by bringing a visual prop of a federal care package to the West 
Virginia poor to hold up before the cameras as a reminder of the meager proportions 
of government assistance they received. This simple gesture attracted the attention 
and votes of more West Virginians than Humphrey did with long speeches. 
Humphrey was completely ineffectual on TV and at times even looked incompetent. 
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In a telethon aired the day before the election, Humphrey decided as a candidate of 
the people he would answer telephone calls cold and without the screening that was 
commonly practiced on live TV. The whole exercise was a debacle. Humphrey had 
to listen patiently to long-winded callers as he watched his precious air time slip 
away, all the while forced to keep a courteous and understanding demeanor. One 
old woman caller greeted the hapless Humphrey by saying "you git out, you hear! 
You can't stand the Republicans gitting ahead of you! Why don't you git out?" [47] 
The final mishap in what turned out to be a comedic performance worthy of Peter 
Seller, s Inspector Clouseau was when Humphrey went to a line to receive a caller 
only to be interrupted by the operator telling Humphrey to clear the line for an 
emergency (the caller was calling from a party line). Humphrey tried in vain to 
explain that he was a candidate for the President of the United States conducting a 
television telethon on live TV, only to be unceremoniously cut off. 
In contrast, Kennedy was his usual self presenting over and over again to the 
voters his image of confidence and success. Kennedy was at home in front of the 
television cameras and in putting on one of the fmest TV performances the noted and 
experienced Theodore White had ever seen confronted the West Virginian voters 
with the issue of religion in his campaign for the presidency of the United States 
head-on. 
Unsure of how to broach the issue, Kennedy and his staff decided at first to 
simply ignore it and hammer away at their primary topic of the economy. As the 
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campaign progressed Kennedy grew weary of this tactic and was particularly 
concerned that he might be giving the impression of avoiding the issue. Prior to a 
large paid telecast he asked Ted Sorensen to put on paper a few of the questions 
Protestants had about the possibility of a Catholic president and planted those 
questions in the audience, much to the surprise of most of his staff. When presented 
with the question of the separation of church and state JFK peered directly into the 
camera addressing the people of West Virginia (it is important to note that this 
practice of directly addressing a TV camera while commonplace now among 
candidates was a novel phenomenon to the TV viewers of that time since this 
technique seemed strange to most political speakers more familiar with addressing 
themselves to people and not technology) saying: 
so when any man stands on the steps ef the Capitol and takes the oath ef cdfice ef 
President, he is swearing to support the separation ef church and state; he puts one 
hand on the Bible and raises the other hand to God as he takes the oath. And if he 
breaks his oath, he is not only committing a crime against the Constitution, for which 
the Congress can impeach him--and should impeach him--but he is committing a sin 
against God. (48) 
Invoking the sacred nature of an oath taken before God on the sacred ground of the 
Capitol and doing it in such a forthright manner was a sure way to convince the 
hearts and minds of God-fearing and patriotic West Virginian people. It did not 
make any difference that an oath taken which is extraneous to the principles of one's 
faith is not necessarily binding (in the Catholic faith God is not at all interested in 
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maintaining the boundaries between church and state and therefor would not serve as 
a reliable arbiter of testimony given on that account)--that would be too involved, 
the West Virginian people made their decision because they believed Kennedy , 
because he was personally convincing. 
On election day, Kennedy, betraying an uncharacteristic lack of confidence, 
flew to Washington. As the results were tallied, Kennedy and Jacqueline dined with 
some friends and afterwards Jack went out to see a movie with a few of them. When 
. he got back late that morning, he received word that he had won the West Virginia 
primary. Kennedy had overwhelmed Humphrey with some sixty percent of the 
vote. Kennedy was now set to go into the convention with the strong momentum of 
primary success--in fact, he ended up winning each and every primary he entered as 
he had told his sister he must do: New Hampshire , Wisconsin, Nebraska, Oregon, 
West Virginia, and Maryland. Even with this tremendous mandate from the 
American voters, Kennedy was leaving nothing to chance and he and his staff went 
into the Los Angeles convention prepared for an all out dog fight for the nomination. 
70 
Bryan Wuthrich 
Masters Thesis: The Kennedy Campaign of 1960 
CHAPTER THREE 
The General Election 
The Democratic National Convention at Los Angeles 
Kennedy ' s penchant for communications was particularly felt at the 
Democratic National Convention. At the convention center, Kennedy used a 
sophisticated electronic media command center including walkie-talkies and 
independently connected telephones. [49] The command center was set up opposite 
the convention center and was manned twenty-four hours a day. Through this 
system the Kennedy staff could coordinate the movements of its agents on the 
convention floor--many of the staff members carried primitive precursors to beepers 
which were then called locators--and get the jump on their rivals. [50] The Kennedy 
staff also created an immense card catalogue of all the convention delegates, whether 
Kennedy called them by their first, last, or nick names, where their hotel rooms 
were and where they might be in their off time. 
In addition to this Salinger also was able to set up a convention newspaper. 
The paper appeared as much as possible to be neutral and covered the activities of all 
the candidates but of course always focused the attention of the reader back to 
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Kennedy. Salinger had the paper hand delivered by his staff to all the convention 
delegates.[51] The paper ran for three issues. As he did for the reporters he wanted 
to make it as easy as possible for the delegates to keep up with the goings on of the 
convention and in particular of Kennedy. 
The main purpose of the convention, however, was to establish a platform for 
the Democratic Party in the upcoming elections. This was a crucial opportunity for 
Kennedy to pull together all the themes of his campaign up to that point and present 
them to the American public in a unified and persuasive manner. Much of the 
success of Kennedy and the longevity of his image has to be credited to the themes 
which he introduced during his election campaign and his ability to fashion from the 
consumerist philosophy of lifestyle and personal fulfillment, then rising to 
preeminence, a deeper message of idealism. This message was to take shape in 
Kennedy' s vision of America expressed at the Los Angeles convention in what would 
be known as the New Frontier. 
Before he could unveil that New Frontier, Kennedy of course had to take care 
of the dirty business of actually winning the nomination and choosing a running 
mate. The tremendous amount of work the Kennedy staff put into setting up its 
communications systems, compiling delegate information, and generally staying on 
top of the chaos that was the convention made sure that Kennedy would be able to 
successfully ride out a last minute Stevenson rally and the best efforts of Lyndon 
Johnson to throw the convention into a deadlock. With all fifteen of Wyoming's 
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delegates going to him, thanks to some behind the scenes wrangling by Ted 
Kennedy, Kennedy won a majority of the delegates on the first ballot. Seeing all 
their hard work and planning come to fruition in so complete a manner made Robert 
Kennedy comment that this was the happiest day of his life (52]. Unfortunately, the 
following day would be, also in his words, the worst day of his life as he saw the 
candidacy for vice president go to Lyndon Johnson. Many people questioned 
Johnson's commitment to what prominent Democratic Party leader, Chester 
Bowles, called the "strong civil rights plank in the Democratic platform" (53] and saw 
the addition of Johnson to the ticket as too much of a compromise--Kennedy's 
eventual narrow margin of victory would show the incontrovertible wisdom of 
putting Johnson on the ticket with Kennedy as he was able to provide for the 
Democrats crucial Southern support. 
Having won the nomination and selected a running mate, Kennedy was finally 
prepared to accept his party's nomination for president of the United States from 
Adlai Stevenson and present to the world his vision of the future and the New 
Frontier. JFK opened his acceptance speech with a proclamation concerning "The 
Rights of Man" that would be worthy of the rhetoric of the French Revolution. The 
overall tone of the speech was bold and sweeping. Kennedy pressed the advantage of 
the Democrats in the battle of rhetoric concerning the direction of mankind which 
the Cold War had developed into; his emphasis on a "new frontier" and a "new 
generation" was directed toward a future of glittering possibilities. The watch 
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words of Republicanism concerning caution, prudence, and tradition were 
reformulated through Kennedy' s rhetoric to represent timidity, prejudice, and 
smallmindedness and were shown to have no place in the great future of the 
American nation. 
Using the age-old American metaphor of the pioneer, Kennedy insisted that 
these founders of the American nation "were not captives of their own doubts, the 
prisoners of their own price tags. Their motto was not 'every man for himself : --but 
'all for the common cause. "'[54] Even if the success of the American pioneers may 
have actually had more to do with their caution, prudence, and tradition then 
Kennedy would have liked us to believe, in the America of the late 1950s and early 
1960s this vision of American pioneers as brave, adventurous, and indomitable was 
extremely popular thanks in large measure to the highly successful TV westerns of 
that era such as Gunsmoke and The Rifleman. 
Kennedy went on to say that "some would say ... that there is no longer an 
American frontier." "But," he quickly countered, 
I tell you the New Frontier is here, whether we seek it or not. Beyond that frontier are 
the uncharted areas ef science and space, unsolved problems ef peace and war, 
unconquered pockets ef i9norance and prejudice, unanswered questions ef poverry and 
surplus. It would be easier to shrink backjrom that frontier, to look to the sefe 
mediocriry ef the past, to be lulled by 9ood intentions and hi9h rhetoric--and those who 
prefer that course should not cast their votes for me, re9ardless ef parry. 
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Kennedy provided an excellent image and one that was bound to strike a resonant 
chord in the American public. To the holy cause of taming the wilderness that was 
implicit in the early history of the United States and its purpose of "manifest 
destiny" --one that millions of Americans relived every evening through television 
westerns--Kennedy added a new and never ending cause to tame the modern 
frontiers of space and time, human poverty and suffering, and to secure the very 
future of mankind, a cause worthy of a great nation and one that no patriotic 
American who believes in the competitive spirit of the American people could deny. 
The foundation of that great cause was set, according to Kennedy, with the 
progressive ideas laid out in Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom, Franklin Roosevelt's 
New Deal, and Harry Truman's Fair Deal. But Kennedy's New Frontier was more than 
just the evolution of those programs; it was their culmination and through it he 
intended to offer the American people "not a set of promises," but instead "a set of 
challenges."[55] Kennedy was careful not to portray the federal government as a 
source for hand outs and to stress instead its role as a catalyst for change. But 
whatever its role, he was intimating an American government with an active role in 
the lives of its people as the coordinating body for its aspirations and as a vehicle for 
its vision of the future of mankind to be brought to the world. 
Kennedy was able to exploit the position of the Democrats to his advantage 
and to the disadvantage of Nixon and the Republicans. In this new Cold War era, 
the struggle was more than a battle of missiles and tanks. It was an ideological battle 
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over the future direction of mankind. The Soviets through the language of 
Communism had managed to stake a claim for themselves as representing the 
vanguard of enlightened rational thought in the developing world and many young 
nationalist leaders (Fidel Castro, Nassar, and Ho Chi Mhin being the most notable 
examples) had come to see their vision as the more progressive one concerning the 
future qf the world. In a climate that lends itself to progressivist activity the 
advantage naturally goes to the Democratic Party. This, in truth, has nothing to do 
with the merit of the positions argued or the actions proposed. Often times, 
inactivity is preferable to counterproductive activity. The strength of a nation's 
character and convictions can be determined by what it does not do just as much as 
by what it does. 
In this context, the brewing controversy during the 1960 campaign 
concerning the so called "missile gap" is worth a brief examination. After some 
notable successes on the part of the Soviets in their missile technology during the 
closing years of the 1950s, the most notable being Sputnik, some stir was created in 
the United States that we were falling behind the Soviets in this critical field. 
President Eisenhower had at his disposal information that, in fact, we enjoyed a 
sizable superiority to the Soviets in our missile strength and that if there was a 
"missile gap" it was decidedly in America's favor. Concerned about the provocation 
of a heightened armed race that release of this information would unleash and the 
dangerous trend toward nuclear destabilization that would ensue, Eisenhower chose 
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not to release this information. Here is evidence of an initiative not seized and a 
demonstration of how the inaction of a top government official can be worthy of 
praise. Future active government programs in the fighting of the Cold War such as 
the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Vietnam War stand as further testimony to the fact 
that frequently it is better to do nothing than to take ill-advised action. 
Unfortunately, under the circumstances of the Cold War and also in the 
arena of public media in which campaigns for election are fought out, inactivity can 
never be an effective tool of persuasion. Media reports activity and not inactivity 
placing a constant premium on doing something to solve problems, even if doing 
something may actually be counter productive or if there is no solvable problem at 
all. It has always been rare in the history of American politics, now it is completely 
unheard of, for a politician to respond to the inquiries of the press concerning this or 
that problem by saying there is nothing that either he or the government can do. No 
matter what the issue or the problem, a politician has to show himself before the 
press as actively concerned and in the process of doing something about "the 
problem". In this light we can see the wisdom of Kennedy' s call to action evident in 
his New Frontier speech, and in his ensuing rhetoric about "getting America moving 
again." To the world in general and to the media who would carry that message to 
the world, the active leadership of the United States would be the focus of attention. 
Richard Nixon, by contrast, would counter during the months leading up to 
the elections that America is moving and that our future was not in jeopardy. He 
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would stress that America was far from being in decline and that it was stronger than 
ever. He would term Kennedy's rhetoric as dangerous and provocative, or even as 
defeatist. Regardless of being true or not, Nixon's position was a disadvantageous 
one in the media--in this light it is interesting to note how the communist issue which 
was initially so damaging to the Democrats and so demoralized them under the "red 
scare" of the early 1950s, was able to be turned so fully to their advantage by 
Kennedy. 
After the tremendous high that was the convention in Los Angeles, Kennedy 
was forced back into the doldrums of the special sessions of Congress called by 
Lyndon Johnson. Initiated as a campaign ploy by candidate Johnson, these sessions 
proved to be a tremendous waste of time and Kennedy was forced to sit on his hands 
while Nixon orchestrated a very successful Republican convention and began his 
campaigning throughout the nation. 
After the Democratic convention, the workings of the Kennedy campaign and 
all its general themes were pretty much in place. No attempt was made to alter what 
was looked upon as a winning formula and all that was left for the Kennedy campaign 
to do was to slam their election juggernaught into the opposition and see who was 
still afloat after November 6. From the top down, the Kennedy staff was confident 
in its abilities and preparation. Despite early polls showing Nixon with the lead 
going into the election, they were certain the coming months would prove them the 
better of the two organizations. 
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Richard Nixon 
The contrasts in background between Kennedy and Nixon are nothing short 
of astonishing. Nixon was born to a dirt-poor California family in Yorba Linda. 
They had a lemon grove and their father tried his hand at small business by opening 
up a small grocery in town. The Nixon family got by but the father, Francis 
Anthony, always felt somewhat inadequate; in a country where success is highly 
valued, just getting by becomes something of a failure and the ambitions of his father 
were never quite fulfilled. Nixon's mother, Hannah, proved to be a dominant force 
in his life; he would, in fact, at the end of his political career make reference to her 
as "a saint" just before leaving the White House for the last time. The Nixon family 
were Quakers, that most Protestant of Protestant faiths (among the reformed 
Christian churches of Europe the Quakers were one of the most radical in their 
theology), and Richard Nixon's mother instilled in her son the strict religious 
principles of her faith against excessive display, both of emotion and of one's own 
abilities. Restraint and modesty were to Nixon the essence of his own beliefs and 
identity as he grew up--obviously this would prove something of a problem later in 
the pursuit of his chosen career as a politician. 
Silent suffering was to be another. Richard Nixon's youngest brother died at 
an early age and one of his older brothers grew ill from tuberculosis just as Richard 
was graduating from college forcing him to give up a scholarship he had received to 
Yale and to attend instead a local and less noteworthy college--the expense of caring 
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for his brother left the Nixon family with nothing left over to support him so far 
from home. 
It is perhaps one of the greatest ironies about Nixon that men in the press like 
Ben Bradley found him elusive and inscrutable as compared to the accessible and 
open Kennedy. After reading Nixon's memoirs, which he wrote entirely by himself, 
there emerges no clearer portrait of a man. One can see displayed all his faults and 
virtues--his manipulative sentimentality as well as his insightful mind and 
perserverent character. Any person attempting to research Kennedy, however, will 
fmd no more elusive and enigmatic figure . 
At the small Whittier College where he earned his undergraduate degree, 
Nixon worked hard to distinguish and improve himself. In his memoirs he shows the 
conscientiousness of a young man anxious to get away from the provincialism of his 
home yet still desirous to maintain the principles of his upbringing. The motto of his 
school club in that tiny community on the very edge of the W estem world provides a 
touching glimpse into the world of a small town boy with big dreams: the motto was 
"Ecrasons L'infame". Nixon did everything he could at Whittier, played on the 
football team, acted in plays, and captained his debating team in addition to his 
carrying out the life work of Voltaire in Southern California. His hard work paid off 
with a scholarship to Duke law school where he graduated near the top of his class. 
He returned to Whittier to work in a local law practice. 
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Nixon had the big dreams of an ambitious man. In this he was the same as 
Kennedy. But Nixon, in order to fulfill his dreams, had to work within the confines 
of other men. Coming from a position of no power and no reputation, Nixon had to 
rely upon the good graces of other men for his advancement. He had to get 
scholarships. He had to get into law firms and when his political career began, he 
had to get the support of party leadership. 
In Whittier, he was well liked in his firm and his law practice prospered. Also 
in Whittier, Nixon met and married his wife Pat; a woman to whom it seems he 
remained faithful all his life. Nixon served in the Navy in W.W.11 and after the war 
ran and was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives as a member of the 
Republican Party. He, like Kennedy, was a member of the freshmen class of 
representatives in 1946. He was elected senator from California in 1950 and became 
vice president of the United States under Eisenhower in 1952, a position he held 
until the end of the elections and 1960. 
Nixon and Kennedy were following converging career paths and in many 
ways the contrasts between the two men were to serve as larger contrasts of broader 
conflicts throughout the nation. The differences between the men became a 
preoccupation with the press and Ben Bradley in his memoirs on the Kennedy era, 
Conversations with Kennedy, gives examples of this phenomenon from an insider's 
perspective worth examining. The first and most notable example of the difference 
between the two men that he stresses is the relative ease, as mentioned before, of 
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I 
gaining access to Kennedy as compared to what Bradley describes as the ordeal of 
trying to interview Nixon or one of his staff--here is provided some tangible proof 
concerning the success of what Salinger called their number one strategy goal, that of 
making the job of the press as easy as possible. Here we can see as well, developing 
as a contrast between the two men, the outgoing and gregarious nature of Kennedy 
compared to the shy and reserved nature of Nixon that would go on to become the 
essence of their differences. In talking about Kennedy's charm, Bradley mentions an 
episode where an incredulous reporter asked Kennedy about the crowd estimates his 
staff were providing to the press; when asked how those estimates were arrived at, 
Kennedy responded, "Plucky (Press Coordinator Pierre Salinger) counts the nuns 
and multiplies by one-hundred." Bradley notes that through his sense of humor 
Kennedy effectively killed what could have been a very damaging story about inflated 
crowd estimates [56]. Bradley contrasts this with what he called in Nixon a complete 
inability to be self deprecating in his humor. This had the effect of increasing tension 
rather than diffusing it as Kennedy could. This winning over of the press was not 
limited in its scope and according to Bradley: "Kennedy had better relations with the 
press that any other president since Margenthaler invented linotype." [57] The 
contrasts between expression and reserve that characterized the differences between 
Kennedy and Nixon provided a foreshadowing oflarger divisions throughout the 
nation that would come to the fore later in the decade and would organize under 
their respective banners as the demonstrators and the silent majority. 
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The sort of affability which Bradley credits to Kennedy is a tremendous asset 
in any public figure's relation to the press. Kennedy understood, having himself 
been a reporter, what the press and subsequently the public were interested in. They 
were clamoring to get behind the facade of power and greatness to see what life in 
that rarefied world was really like. 
Many writers have pointed to Kennedy' s Catholic background as giving him 
an intuitive sense of the role of monarchy in the eyes of the public. [58] There seems 
to be some truth in this with respect to an understanding of the importance of 
manners and style with which a monarch sets the tone for a society. For some time 
the United States had lived with a crude utilitarian work ethic as the primary mode of 
behavior. In the words of Calvin Coolidge, "the business of the United States is 
business." People's mannerism, it was generally thought, should be dictated by the 
simple and honest premise of work and necessity. There were of course some efforts 
to fashion vague notions of aesthetic and style, most often awkwardly patched 
together from the various European aristocracies the American rich sought to 
emulate, as a means of crowning this rampant form of capitalist ethic in America (the 
great mansions at Newport being a prime example) but the budding aristocrats could 
never be quite convincing in their self-conscious roles and were never able to buck 
the label of illegitimacy evident in their popular title as the "robber barons." 
With Kennedy there seemed to be emerging a genuine home-grown man of 
nobility. He had the air of European royalty but he also seemed to be unmistakably 
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American. What is more, he seemed to be a man of the modern world. Modernity 
was an element with which he seemed completely at home--his interest in and 
comfort in front of the media being a prime example of this--and he moved about 
this emerging modern landscape confidently showing all those uncertain yet aspirant 
Americans whose ancestors had toiled in obscurity just how to behave in this new age 
and how truly wonderful it is. In the words of Peirre Salinger, Kennedy "was a fresh 
voice in American politics--a voice that cut through much of the polemic of our time, 
and got down to a discussion of living in an atomic world."(59] 
It is probably worth while to take a moment and try and get a handle on what 
modernism and modernity is. Like many terms in history, the term modern is an 
elusive one and tends to have different meanings at different times. For instance, the 
Victorians considered themselves to be modern, as did the Communists, as do we. 
Once again it maybe helpful to come upon some working definition of the term 
through trying to describe it by what it is not. Modernism can, in whatever form it 
takes, be contrasted against its predecessor in the context of European history. 
Modernism is not Medieval Europe. It contrasts itself against the stagnation and 
inefficiency that has often been (by modernists) associated with the Middle Ages. 
Therefore modernism represents a dynamism in human conduct and in that sense it 
is artificial in that humans in the modern setting regulate their lives by their own 
terms in accordance with there own purposes and not by terms dictated solely by 
their environment (i.e .. the rising and the setting of the sun, the summer and winter 
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solstice etc.). To get people to relate more actively with their environment requires 
motivation. Probably the greatest challenge of the various civilizations in the modern 
era is to come upon some sort of rational for this dynamic and artificial way of life in 
the modern world. 
In keeping with the modernist ideal as it came to be formulated by American 
consumerism, life was meant to be lived to the fullest.[60) Old inhibitions needed to 
be shrugged off as remnants of a bygone era. Life was intended to be enjoyed. In 
this line of thinking, Kennedy represented all these ideals. Progressively, many of 
the traditional mores concerning sex were being broken down in the postwar era. In 
the modern world as presented to the American public in television and cinema, 
traditional ethics about sexuality were often presented as old fashioned or as 
repressive. Although the public was at the time unaware of Kennedy' s private life 
with women other than his wife, they certainly were aware of his tremendous sexual 
charisma of which the legions of female "jumpers" who followed Kennedy wherever 
he went, much in the same manner as they would with rock and roll stars, stood as 
evidence. In the parlance of the budding youth movement which was just taking 
shape under the Kennedy administration, the modern world should be free of the 
"hang ups" that imprison people in the mentality of bygone eras. In many ways 
Kennedy was the embodiment of that new era. As it turned out, Nixon, became 
Kennedy's antithesis. Johnson was antithetical as well but in the words of media 
historian Mary Watson: "Kennedy happens to look like a composite of all the good 
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guy stereotypes TV has created [61f' and every stereotype needs its alter ego; a role 
that, increasingly, Nixon came to fill. 
It is interesting to note in reference to the power of the media to shape 
opinions how in so many ways these stereotypes seem to fit in nicely with how 
perceptions of these men eventually came to be fixed in the minds of the public. 
Johnson could never fill the role of Kennedy' s nemesis. He was too bumbling and 
did not seem capable of fitting the bill. Johnson was acutely aware of the Kennedy 
image and in many ways felt imprisoned by it. Paul Henggeler in his book, The 
Kennedy Persuasion, portrays a Johnson obsessed with the legacy of Kennedy as its 
beneficiary, albeit illegitimate, as its caretaker, and as its prisoner. Johnson could 
simply not get out of Kennedy' s shadow as far as his image was portrayed in the 
media. In Nixon, by contrast, we can fmd a true villain worthy of a man like 
Kennedy. He worked outside the media and appealed over their heads to the "silent 
majority" of American people by calling for traditional values and conservatism; in 
many ways he seemed reactionary to the ideals of Kennedy. These perceptions are 
strong as well as persistent and can be best illustrated in the recent treatment of the 
two men in Oliver Stone's two films, JFK and NIXON. 
The Houston Ministerial Conference 
The first bump in the rode for the Kennedy campaign during the general 
election came once again from a religious issue that just refused to die. Nixon, of 
course, was smart enough to avoid even the hint that he was going to capitalize on 
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this issue but when a pastor of no less standing than Norman Vincent Peale openly 
raised doubts about the compatibility of Kennedy' s religion with the office of the 
president of the United States, he did nothing to ease those concerns. Peale was still 
just the tip of the iceberg and in a memorandum written by Kennedy staff er, Ruth 
Kingman, and circulated throughout the Kennedy staff the scope of the problem was 
evident in "differing degrees and at several levels." Kingman went on the catagorize 
the various groups of Protestant opposition to Kennedy including northern white 
Protestants and Southern white Protestants, as well as Northern black and Southern 
black Protestants. Each of these four groups was targeted separately and barraged 
with leaflets, mailers, TV and radio spots, and letters designed to appeal to its 
specific constituency. An effort was also made once again at trying to elicit from the 
liberal Protestant community a call for tolerance in this political struggle. 
The memo focused particular attention on the importance of the black 
Protestant community. In this tight race the role of the black vote was seen as 
critical for the Kennedy election and according to the memo the role of the church in 
winning that vote was crucial. The memo states: 
Special efforts should be made to enlist the aid ef Negro ministers, both in the North 
and in the South, particularly in the South ... Negro parishioners traditionally look to 
their pastors for guidance in all areas ef living. This influence should not be 
underestimated, as these ministers are the key to the political attitudes q,(the :Oocks''. 
[62](underlining in the original) 
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It was looked upon with some measure of irony by Kennedy himself that many of the 
religious leaders of the black civil rights movement were themselves prejudiced 
against Catholics in high government and for that reason were hesitant to openly 
support him. 
In reference to this resistance in the black religious community, the memo 
singles out the potential role of the wives of black religious leaders saying that "if 
these men are reluctant to have their names used [in support for Kennedy or at least 
in support for religious toleration], and some are, efforts should be make to enlist 
support from their wives, many of whom feel free to speak, and do so with the 
approval of the husbands." This tactic was to be used with spectacular success later 
on in the campaign. 
A conference was organized by the leading Protestant groups in the United 
States in which the candidates would be given an opportunity to address themselves 
to these groups on the topic of religion in politics. Nixon having nothing to prove 
before the groups politely declined to attend. It was Kennedy whose views were of 
interest to the Protestant community and he quickly agreed to speak before the 
conference and before a nationally televised audience. 
Having nothing really to add to his already near perfect performances on the 
subject in West Virginia, Kennedy essentially rehashed the same arguments in the 
same convincing style as he did earlier in the primaries--the only unusual occurrence 
being that the flawlessly correct Kennedy was forced to wear brown shoes with a 
88 
Bryan Wuthrich 
Masters Thesis: The Kennedy Campaign of 1960 
blue suit due to a mishap by one of his staff. For most of those in attendance and 
many of those on TV, however, this was their first exposure to Kennedy and in what 
everybody recognized to be a decidedly polite but hostile environment many were 
impressed with his composure and the coolness of his argument. What came to be 
known as the Houston Ministerial Conference was a smashing success for the 
Kennedy campaign and they were to show exerpts from it thoughout the remainder 
of the campaign. 
The Debates 
At the same time as the Houston Ministerial Conference, the details were 
being worked out by the Kennedy and Nixon teams in cooperation with the 
television networks to set up a televised debate between the two candidates. This 
had never been done before and the TV networks were very anxious to put on the 
debates as an example of the great value the medium could bring to the American 
people as a public sevice--it was at this time that television was encountering 
tremendous amounts of criticism in the public and in political circles for not fulfilling 
its mandate to serve in the public interest. In order to put on the debates, in fact, an 
article of the Federal Communications Committee's government charter regarding 
broadcast television requiring equal time for all candidates for political office had to 
be amended by Congress to allow a meeting of the two main candidates only, 
excluding all fringe candidates. [63) Not surprisingly, a lot of interest was generated 
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throughout the country in this first-ever televised debate. Unfortunately, however, 
the approach of the public to this event was largely skewed by its perceptions of 
other confrontational events covered by television. This meeting between Kennedy 
and Nixon would take on more an air of a boxing match than a thoughtful debate of 
the issues facing the country. 
Four debates were arranged between the two candidates: the first in Chicago, 
the second in Washington, the third a simulcast between Nixon in Los Angeles and 
Kennedy in New York (a real feather in the cap of the broadcast industry), and the 
fourth and fmal debate back in New York. Kennedy and his staff were quick to 
accept the proposed debates as they were at the time behind in the polls and the 
debates offered an excellent chance to showcase their candidate to the national 
public. In particular Kennedy needed to give the American public a good impression 
of his capabilities and experience. Nixon, having been vice president for some eight 
years, was the better known of the two candidates and was generally viewed as the 
more experienced as well. 
Coming into the debates Kennedy had everything to gain and almost nothing 
to lose. Since televised debates had never before been held--and they would not be 
done again for some sixteen years--Nixon was not really obligated to participate in 
them and some of his advisors cautioned him against providing Kennedy with a 
forum and by association elevating him to an equal stature. It is difficult to say what 
political damage would have been done to the Nixon campaign if he had pulled out of 
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the debates--in retrospect it is certain that Kennedy' s good showing in the debates 
and his general exposure through them made a difference in his razor thin margin of 
victory over Nixon--but refusing to debate Kennedy would have simply been out of 
character for Nixon. He was always a confrontational political figure. He relished 
the opportunity for debate and felt confident in his own debating skills. He also, like 
Kennedy, was comfortable in the new medium of TV. His performances on TV in 
his famous "Checkers" speech which salvaged his political career and his spot on the 
GOP ticket in 1952 and his world renowned "Kitchen Debate" with So"iet leader 
Krushchev were his previous successes in that medium. There simply was no 
possibility that Nixon would not meet Kennedy in this first ever televised debate 
even if as some suggest it may have cost him the election.[64] 
Of the four debates it is the first which is singled out by most reporters at the 
time as well as by historians since as being the most decisive. This makes sense, of 
course, because it was the most anticipated and most viewed of the debates. Nixon 
campaigned hard up to and including the day of the debate; he had scheduled several 
meetings the day of the debate, September 26. Several days before the debate Nixon 
had accidentally and somewhat severely injured his leg while getting out of a car. He 
had spent some time in the hospital and the day of the debate many thought he 
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Kennedy, in contrast, had left the day of the debate free in his schedule and 
spent the entire evening before going over potential questions with his advisors. He 
had also spent some time shortly before the debate at his family compound in Florida 
and looked the picture of health with a slight tan on his face.[65] Kennedy's staff 
arrived at the studios early in the day to work out blocking and lighting for their 
candidate. They worked closely with the debate's producers about how the show 
was to be shot and generally attended to every detail in its production,[66] while 
Nixon and his staff by contrast arrived at the studio only shortly before air time. His 
staff was attentive enough to reverse some of the lighting decisions the shows 
producers had made with the "help" of the Kennedy staff. 
The two most crucial factors for which this historic debate will forever be 
remembered, however, were put into play only minutes before air time. Nixon had 
requested that the temperature in the studio be lowered to around sixty degrees and 
just minutes before the debate applied makeup known as "lazy shave" to cover over 
his fast growing facial hair. Kennedy, noticing the change in the temperature, asked 
one of his staff to have it raised. When the staff member realized that it was as per 
specific instructions of Nixon, he surreptitiously arranged for one of the stage hands 
to have it raised via the main thermostats below the studio. [67] The debates will 
always be remembered for the ill looking and gaunt appearance of Nixon as 
compared to the youthful and healthy looking Kennedy but, what is more, many 
Americans came to perceive the relative success of the two candidates based on their 
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response to the debate itself and for those Americans the sight of Nixon wiping the 
sweat away from his face and the distinct traces of make-up showing up in the camera 
lights on his complexion were clear indications that Nixon was unnerved by 
Kennedy. 
This phenomenon in the first debate of the interplay between image and 
perception is of interest in two ways. First, pertaining to the relative appearance of 
the two men, the phenomenon is nothing short of ironic. Of the two men, Nixon 
was by far the more healthy of the two. Behind that robust exterior that Kennedy 
presented to the public, it is now known Kennedy hid a severe and debilitating 
illness, Addison's disease. The second is that of those who were surveyed after the 
debate to determine the relative effectiveness of the two men, the majority of those 
who listened to the debate on radio found Nixon to have been the most effective 
while those who watched on TV scored Kennedy as the winner; image, as deceptive 
as it was, was clearly a decisive factor. Fortunately for Kennedy the overwhelming 
majority of Americans, some seventy million (at that time the highest ever television 
rating for any program), watched the debates on TV.[68] 
The famous shot of Nixon wiping the sweat and makeup from his face is also 
worth some closer attention. The shot, referred to in TV parlance as a "cut away", 
was something of an anomaly. In fact there were very few "cutaways" during the 
length of the debate; almost the whole time the camera invariably stayed with the 
candidate who was speaking. It is hard to believe that of all the times in which a cut 
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away could have taken place it was simply coincidence that it happened at this 
particular and compromising moment. An aid to Kennedy remembers the event and 
thinking as he saw the "cut away" on the screen that they had won--that is how 
noticeable it was. [69] Beyond the possibility of favoritism which has already been 
established in the press, it could be argued that the TV director in question, whose 
political preferences are unknown and trained as all good television men are in 
viewing television as a dramatic medium, simply picked up the shot because it 
seemed to him to be evocative. 
Although it would have probably been impossible to prevent the "showdown" 
atmosphere of this, the first-ever presidential debate, the press and in particular the 
television networks who were so anxious to stress their role as public servant could 
have done more to at least try to dampen the drama of the event and the inevitable 
distortions that it caused. It seems, however, that their own enthusiasm caused them 
to get caught up in the excitement of the moment and that left them with no capacity 
to reverse its course--at their worst moments, like the famous "cut away", they 
rather shortsightedly added fuel to the fire. 
On the whole, however , the first debate and the following three came off as 
fairly well balanced, at least in the manner in which the two candidates were treated. 
If one wants to closely analyze the performance of the journalist questioners it is 
difficult to find any gross overall bias toward either candidate. It can be said, 
however, that while each candidate got his share of soft questions, which amounted 
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to nothing more than an opportunity for the candidate to give his views on a 
particular issue, it seems that Nixon got a little more than his share of hard hitting 
questions which are more aggressive and usually require the candidate to backtrack 
and try to explain some inconsistency or some particularly embarrassing issue. One 
questioner, for instance, asked Nixon to explain his self-proclaimed greater level of 
experience in reference to an embarrassing comment made to the press by 
Eisenhower (Eisenhower was asked to name some important administration 
decisions in which Nixon was involved). To the question Eisenhower had 
responded, "I don't know but give me a few days and I'll come up with some." This 
was particularly a hard hitting question and one to which the befuddled Nixon could 
not readily respond. Kennedy had to respond to some tough questions as well but 
on the whole not as many and in this instance nothing nearly as tough even though 
there were several equally embarrassing and inconsistent episodes in his political 
career--his stand on McCarthy and his frec1uent absences and poor voting record in 
Congress come to mind. 
Despite Kennedy' s successes, the first debate and the others that followed 
were fairly even and no decisive knockout blow was scored by either candidate. 
Kennedy, it could be said--in keeping with the boxing metaphor--won by points on a 
split decision. After the first debate, however, it has been widely recorded that there 
was a noticeable upswing in the morale of the Kennedy camp while there was an 
equal down swing in the morale of Nixon's. Concerned Republicans called Nixon's 
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staff after the debate in Chicago to inquire whether or not Nixon was well while a 
group of assembled Democratic governors who had been previously lukewarm to the 
Kennedy campaign called the candidate to offer their full and enthusiastic support. 
[70] Kennedy may have only just slightly got the better of Nixon in the debate but he 
had completely proven himself as a competent and worthy adversary of Nixon and 
that turned out to be in itself a tremendous-- and in retrospect, decisive--victory for 
Kennedy. In the words of Ted Sorensen, the crucial issue of Kennedy' s youth had 
been completely "neutralized". [71] 
During the debates, and particularly in the second debate, Kennedy was also 
cleverly able to position himself to the right of Nixon on the crucial issue of Cuba. 
Echoing previous claims during the 1952 presidential elections that the Democrats 
had lost China, Kennedy turned the tables asserting that timidity in Republican 
foreign policy had lost Cuba and that the current administration was doing nothing to 
try to reverse the situation there. Kennedy was able to effectively establish his 
credentials as a Cold Warrior. 
Telephone call to Mrs. King 
In the close race that was the election of 1960, the debates are one thing 
which is often singled out as having turned the tide in Kennedy's favor; another 
would be the African American vote. As can be seen in Kennedy aid Ruth 
Kingman' s memo to Kennedy and the election staff, the black vote was looked upon 
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as crucial to the Kennedy camp and they worked feverishly, particularly in the black 
press, to try and win over as many African Americans as they could to their side. 
From 1936 to 1956 the black vote had been anywhere from 68-32 or 72-28 
percent Democratic (Pittsburgh Courier, National Edition, Nov 5, 1960). In this 
close contest, even a few black votes sacrificed to the Republicans were looked upon 
as unthinkable by the Kennedy team. To bring the black vote even more to the fore, 
the national edition of the Pittsburgh Courier, at that time one of the most 
prominent voices in the black press, wrote on the week of the election: 
We firmly believe that in 1960, Republicans had their best chance in twenty-eight 
years to corral a substantial Negro vote. We know that as of July 14, 1960, Negro voters were 
faced with a real dilemma. The couldn't understand the "shot 9un" weddin9 ef Senators Lyndon 
Johnson and John Kennedy. [72] 
There was also the very public meeting between Kennedy and governor Patterson 
and representative Max Engelhardt of Alabama, both vocal supporters of segregation, 
after the convention and which the African American community felt was 
particularly offensive. 
Despite this opportunity, the Nixon campaign failed to capitalize on this 
potential opening left by Kennedy. The title of the article from which the previous 
quote was taken was, "Has the GOP Written Off Negro's Vote?" and the overall 
answer given was, yes. For reasons that seem hard to understand, the Nixon 
campaign did not actively pursue black support. One possible motive may have been 
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to try to win the South by letting the Democrats self-destruct over the race issue. 
This does not seem to be very wise since those southern whites who violently hated 
Kennedy and the Democratic party's progressive civil rights plank were going to 
vote against him no matter what and by trying to preserve votes that were to a large 
degree reactionary and immutable he ended up losing votes that were uncommitted 
and up for grabs. 
At any rate, any quick look through the black press at the time of the elections 
will turn up page after page of Kennedy advertisements directed specifically at the 
African American community. There are advertisements showing pictures of 
Kennedy with prominent black leaders: with Elmar C. Jackson, president of the 
National Bar Association; with Congressman Willam S. Moorhead of Pittsburgh; 
and Edward B. Toles, chairman of the NBA Judiciary Committee. There are 
advertisement concerning Kennedy' s bold position on civil rights with a quote (with 
more ellipses than Swiss cheese has holes) form Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of 
the NAACP, saying: 
The Senator's record, taken as a whole, and includin9 certainly his Jorthri9ht and 
repeated support ef the Supreme Court public school dese9re9ation cases, must be 
re9arded . . . as one ef the best votin9 records on civil ri9hts and related issues ef any 
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The same advertisement also contains a quote from black Congressman Adam Powell 
stating that Nixon, the "Great Pretender, says he is in favor of civil rights. That is 
not even a half-truth." Another advertisement touts the Democratic Party' s "Rights 
of Man" and its sweeping and broad commitment to equal rights for black 
Americans. To any African American who followed the black press it must have 
been abundantly clear that John Kennedy was actively seeking his or her vote. 
An article in the October 28th edition of the national edition of the Pittsburgh 
Courier makes the situation plain: "From highly reliable sources we are informed 
that Senator John Kennedy and his team are leaving no stone unturned to make the 
most favorable impression on the Negro voters." The article, entitled "Which Party 
Is Making Best Effort to Grab Negro Vote?", goes on to say: "As of today LJust over 
one week to election day], the Democrats have by far the better organizational 
structure to get the Negro vote. This is an incontrovertible fact ." The article ends 
by saying "the best salesman will collect the Negro vote" and leaves no doubt as to 
who the better salesman is.[74] 
One other major victory which the Kennedy election campaign was able to 
secure in its fight for the support of the black voter was more of a spontaneous 
occurrence, although it is clear from Ruth Kingman' s memo that the ideas that 
triggered it were already in the thoughts of the Kennedy staff. On October 19, 
Martin Luther King was arrested with fifty-two other black civil rights workers in a 
department store in Atlanta. They were attempting to desegregate the lunch counter 
99 
Bryan Wuthrich 
Masters Thesis: The Kennedy Campaign of 1960 
there and were arrested for creating a public disturbance. Five days later all the 
others arrested with Dr. King were released; King was held and later sentenced to 
four months of hard labor on the basis of an outstanding traffic violation for which he 
was still on probation. 
A worker in the civil rights section of Kennedy's campaign, Harris Wofford 
suggested to his superior, Sargent Shriver (Kennedy's brother-in-law), that Kennedy 
telephone directly to Mrs. King in Georgia to express his concern. Shriver then 
contacted Kennedy in Chicago. The candidate's r eaction, according to Theodore 
White, was "impulsive, direct and immediate." [75] He called Mrs. King from his 
hotel room and assured her of his interest and concern. Mrs. King later informed a 
few of her closest friends and through channels of black leadership, the word swiftly 
spread that Kennedy had intervened to protect the imprisoned King. Robert 
Kennedy followed up with a telephoned plea for King's release to the judge who had 
set the sentence and by Thursday King was free on bail. 
In the November Sth edition of the Pittsburgh Courier Mrs. King stated 
publicly that Kennedy had in fact called her and that she told him how much she 
appreciated his concern and "hoped he would be of help." King upon his release 
stated to the press that "I understand that Senator Kennedy served as a great 
influence in effecting the release." And although King as a member of a non-partisan 
organization would not state openly his choice for president, the whole event served 
as a tremendous boost for the Kennedy campaign in getting out the black vote. In 
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the words of King's father who was less concerned with protecting his non-partisan 
image, "because this man [Kennedy] was willing to wipe the tears from my 
daughter[inlaw]' s eyes, I've got a suitcase of votes, and I'm going to take them to Mr. 
Kennedy and dump them in his lap." [76] 
The tally 
Kennedy and his staff spent election day at the family compound in Hyannis, 
Massachusetts. The count remained inconclusive throughout the entire day and into 
the night. By midnight, Kennedy had had enough and went to sleep with his brother 
Bobby still manning the telephone lines and frantically keeping on top of the results 
as they came in. The next day when he awoke he was president-elect of the United 
States of America. 
Kennedy won with a plurality of just one-tenth of one percent and a majority 
of just over one-hundred thousand votes out of some sixty-eight and a half million 
votes cast--he actually won fewer states that did Nixon, twenty-three to Nixon's 
twenty-seven. In particular the razor thin margins of victory that Kennedy received 
in the electorate rich states of Illinois and Texas were what turned the tide for 
Kennedy in the election--two states with significant black voting populations, 
incidentally. 
In what was the closest presidential election this century, it is certain that the 
clever positioning and use of the media by the Kennedy campaign particularly with 
respect to the debates and the African American vote were what were the deciding 
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factors in the struggle. Again, the Pittsburgh Courier national edition on July 23, 
1960, in what would turn out to be some very prophetic words said: 
His [Kennedy' selection} operation was so professional and so efficient that it has set in 
motion a new era of political promotion which mi9ht revolutionize the entire process of 
national elections.[77] 
Kenney and his staff had achieved what they intended, but the effects of their 
campaign would be much greater than winning the office of the presidency . 
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Conclusion 
The 1960 election was an example of a moment in the history of a culture 
where the varying forces within it came together, wrestled with each other, and a 
completely new cultural entity arose that while still having some connection with its 
past was nonetheless vastly different from it. The victory of the United States in 
W.W.11 set this country on a course that was once and for all severed from the way 
of life in which it grew into one of the world's greatest powers. If one were to liken 
it to the growth of a young child it is analogous to that one moment in that child's 
life where he reaches boldly beyond the world of his childhood and from that 
moment on he struck with the bitter and liberating realization that there is no 
turning back. Of course the seemingly safe and inviolable world of childhood is but a 
an illusion just as the image of this country existing in its own version of splendid 
isolation was equally deceptive. The truth of the matter is that the child through his 
own actions destroys that illusion just as the world as he grows to maturity is bound 
to recognize the potency he represents and react to him--it is probably much better 
that the child destroys the illusion than he let the world do it for him. The break 
with the pleasing and nurturing illusions of republican virtue and American 
exceptionalism was in the making for some time, through the industrial revolution 
and W.W. I, but somehow Americans could still fall back on these comforting and 
103 
complacent ideas that they lived in a different world than everyone else and that they 
were safe there. 
After W.W.11, however, things had changed. There would be no going back 
to the way things were. In many ways it was as if a new nation had been born. 
Before the citizens of America dangled a new perception of the world which they had 
long thought to be there but which was now tantalizingly right before their faces. It 
was a world of almost limitless possibilities and one that seemed more or less open to 
be shaped at their will. Simultaneous with this realization was the companion 
realization that the world (or some power in it) had seen us. W e were not alone in 
the world. We were no longer safe and there would no longer be any buffer 
whether in distance or in other nations between us and the hostile fury of a 
competitor. This moment of realization is not maturity but only the recognition of 
its potential, both for the good and for the bad. It sets into motion a fury of activity 
that directs the individual or nation on a course of preparation for the future where 
the actor hopes to thrust himself into the world and realize himself there. 
By the time of the 1960 campaign of John F. Kennedy America stood poised 
to do this and realize itself on the world stage. Within JFK' s election team were 
arrayed all the strengths of this nation, its intellectual muscle, its industrial and 
economic muscle, and its marketing muscle. JFK himself had even fought for this 
country and achieved victory in battle. He advocated a strong military as well, but 
what is more he represented all the strengths of this country and the consumer 
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culture engine that gave them power and he wove them all into an ideology of what 
Americans were and how they interacted with their world that is the most 
fundamental requirement of any culture. He symbolized what modern America was, 
to ourselves and the world. Consequently, the issues of his campaign were to be the 
main issues of what life in the modern world had to offer the citizens of this country 
as well as the challenges it posed. 
One major component into this new flowering of American culture was the 
influence of what has been termed America's immigrant population which emigrated 
to the U.S. from Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
struggle of the American immigrant population had for nearly a century been the 
dominant theme of American social and domestic history. Its effects were much 
broader than simply the issue of various immigrant families trying to make a way for 
themselves in a difficult environment. As soon as these huge populations of Irish, 
German, Polish, and Italian (among others) immigrant groups found their way onto 
American soil, all "nonimmigrant" groups knew that their arrival meant changes in 
American culture beyond the needed supply of labor they repr esented. Their arrival 
marked a territorial battle for cultural hegemony in the United States that turned up 
in countless aspects of American life over the course of the next hundred years. The 
labor movement, the temperance movement, the Progressive movement, the Ku 
Klux Klan and the Red Scare of the twenties, as well as the battle between organized 
crime and the FBI, all of these were battlefields in a larger war for cultural power in 
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America. The election of Jolm Kennedy marked the end of that chapter in American 
history, at least for the European immigrant population. 
In the history of any era, it is interesting to note how seldom historians deal 
with the concept of ambition in the figures they examine. Generally, if it is 
mentioned at all it is done so as a criticism. Normally if an historian is favorably 
disposed to his subject, he ignores ambition entirely and either takes it for granted 
that his subject would achieve the powerful position in life he has attained--as if by 
some personal tide of destiny--or, and this is most often the case for American 
historians in their coverage of American historical figures, he is characterized as being 
drawn to the heavy burden of leadership reluctantly, out of responsibility toward his 
country in its hour of need. It is something of a taboo for historians to admit that 
their favorite historical subjects may have been driven to power on the basis of a 
personal interest in it. With respect to Kennedy, this has become a focus of debate, 
whether or not he was driven by personal or family ambition. 
We have already seen how Kennedy represents the sociological force of Irish 
Catholic ambition in particular and immigrant ambition in general toward social 
legitimacy and there is as well represented in the Kennedy campaign and the 
subsequent Kennedy administration a national ambition to display to the world a 
vision of American power and leadership that I will discuss more later . But there are 
as well other aspects to ambition evident in the Kennedy campaign. For instance 
there is no escaping the fact that it was primarily the drive of the Kennedy family 
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itself that made the Kennedy organization run so smoothly. Particularly with respect 
to Robert Kennedy, it is clear that he was motivated by a sense of family loyalty and 
family honor that went beyond a level that could be matched by the ordinary, or 
even extraordinary for that matter, professional campaigner. This was a sense of 
familial esprit de corps that was found throughout the Kennedy family and found its 
way as well through to the upper levels of the campaign staff (some of whom like 
Sargent Shriver were even related to the Kennedys by marriage) and down into the 
rank and file. No doubt, much of the charm which has been ascribed to the Kennedy 
campaign in its ability to bring people on board and attract a dedicated volunteer 
force comes from that appearance of selfless devotion that has its roots in the 
Kennedy family ambition. Of course with any family ambition, as dedicated to the 
collective cause that any of the individual members may be, one can not say that their 
drive is selfless, at least not in a complete sense. Family ambition has a very selfish 
motive in trying to impose the force of the family name in culture by turning it into a 
cultural symbol. To do this it seeks esteem by occupying its most coveted positions 
and laying claim to the various symbols and representations of virtue that exist within 
a given culture. In the case of Kennedy campaign, clearly, the cause of establishing 
the Kennedy name was their overarching and unifying goal, as it was as well with the 
Roosevelt and Adams family names I mentioned at the beginning of this work. This 
striving for a family dynasty was a major force behind the Kennedy campaign. It 
should not be viewed solely as a negative although the irony of the situation is that 
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within the ideology of traditional republicanism that has for so long been a part of 
American culture there is no place for ambition, familial or otherwise; it is simply 
not considered to be virtuous. Consequently one of the virtues that one often finds 
claimed by various ambitious American families of Anglo-Saxon stock prior to 
Kennedy is their avowed lack of ambition. The incongruity of this aspect of 
republican ideology constantly being invoked by certain historical figures to establish 
their virtue and greatness in the eyes of the public in order to satisfy their ambition 
can at times be nothing short of astonishing.[78] The Kennedys were, contrary to 
Anglo-Saxon republican etiquette, openly ambitious and this to many was 
reprehensible. To gain some perspective on this heated issue, perhaps we should 
recognize, condone, and even at times applaud ambition and thus by keeping this 
issue in the open it can be approached realistically. from the perspective that the 
public virtues we all value so highly very often stem from private vices or ambitions. 
Ambition is, after all, one of the primary elements that makes a consumer culture 
run and as such is an integral aspect of modern American life. 
The nation before the Kennedy campaign was struggling to find some sense of 
self direction within its new role as leader of the free world which it was our 
collective ambition to fill. All the elements that went into formulating the American 
Cold War ideology existed and were well known before the election of 1960. The 
election did not create anything new but instead effectively drew together some 
powerful cultural concepts that had long been in currency in American society and 
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unified them into a cohesive whole that pointed to a new future and destiny that was 
both appealing and convincing. Kennedy and his staff, from that very first general 
meeting in October, 1959, were aware that their cause would be best served by 
focusing on the dynamism symbolized in their young candidate. At his press 
conference announcing his candidacy, Kennedy stressed his new vision for the future 
of the nation and his ideas of"how to give direction to our traditional moral purpose, 
awakening every Americans to the dangers and opportunities that confront us. 11(79) 
Throughout the campaign the speech writing staff led by Sorensen worked on this 
theme of destiny and greatness laying dormant in the American people; in the battle 
of rhetoric during the election they proved themselves the undisputed masters of the 
field time and again. In Kennedy they had a speaker who seemed not only to be 
unafraid of the atomic age and the Cold War but who when he spoke could actually 
make these difficult and intimidating times seem welcome. More than any other 
candidate Kennedy embraced the challenges of the modern world without any 
hesitation and without any fear and this separated him from the pack. Kennedy' s 
writers sensed this and could see its effect on the crowd. Consequently they honed 
their words and their themes with increasing clarity and potency towards the goal of 
coming up with an overall conceptual framework for Kennedy and the nation that 
would prove resonant. By the time of the Democratic National Convention, they 
had sown together an impressive piece of work in the New Frontier. 
109 
The New Frontier has gone on to become the lasting vision of America's 
national ambition in the crisis of the Cold War and even beyond. Its themes and 
rhetoric about a never ending battle against the challenges to mankind are still a part 
of the cultural fabric of this nation. 1998' s number one movie at the box office, 
Arma9eddon, shows just how potent this legacy is since it manages to maintain this 
same message of American spirit in the face of adversity even in a post-Cold War 
world--coincidentally, as if rhetorical homage were not enough and so as to make the 
link with the spirit of Kennedy' s New Frontier completely inescapable, a Kennedy 
election poster features prominently in a shot midway through the movie. 
Arma9eddon is, of course, not the only example but only one of many instances where 
the images and rhetoric of Kennedy' s New Frontier have been recycled throughout 
the media. 
One historian has lamented the lack of study of the effects of Kennedy' s 
rhetoric on the nation. [80] I would like to second that lament. Within the confines 
of this work, I have come in contact with the potency of this rhetoric and its 
associated imagery, and it seems to have been very influential on much of the 
provocative rhetoric and the unrest that was prominent later in the decade. In 
particular, the rhetoric of the Students for a Democratic Society and the New Left 
comes to mind and seems very evocative of Kennedy' s rhetoric . It is unwise to 
underestimate the power of words well put together and presented from positions of 
power and respect, especially on the young mind. Unfortunately, many historians 
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view political rhetoric as just so much fluff or confine its role to simple 
reinforcement. Words, however, are the primary way in which humans orient 
themselves in the universe. Other animals can rely on land marks or scents. 
Humans see themselves and act through words. Probably neither the speech writers 
or Kennedy himself had any idea of the possible impact their words could have. This 
is surprising of course in the sense that they were obviously writing and speaking 
those words to make an impact but consciously they were only thinking of the 
immediate goal of winning the presidency. Its impact, however, went well beyond 
that. The general conceptual framework they put together linking the nations past 
to its present and pointing the whole toward a future of sacrifice and challenge but 
pregnant with the possibility of greatness was very effective in influencing the 
thinking of their audience on deeper levels than the immediate question of which 
man they would vote into office. It would be interesting to examine how much 
effect Kennedy' s rhetoric had on the minds of those young men and women who in 
groups like the Students for a Democratic Society would use rhetoric of similar 
urgency later in the decade. 
The rhetoric that Kennedy and his staff developed during the campaign to 
help formulate the issues of the nation and their vision of its future were without 
doubt among the most potent in American history. The fact that this also occurred 
at a time when the media had developed enough to record and broadcast that 
rhetoric and the images of its delivery to every living citizen and actually bring him 
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or her face to face with the speaker probably makes Kennedy' s rhetoric the most 
potent in history in the degree to which it as penetrated and impacted society. Even 
to this day, Kennedy' s speeches are probably the most rebroadcast of any historical 
American figure. 
This last fact may have some future impact the office of the presidency in the 
United States. Increasingly, Americans, as they grow up and learn what a president 
is, are going to get an idea of the president as an historical institution based on images 
they have seen as much on the rhetoric that goes along with them. As I have already 
said, Kennedy is a president with no shortage of filmed images. If only for this fact, 
he is going to beat out his predecessors in becoming the template of what Americans 
look for in their president. As for his successors to office, it could be argued that 
none reached his level image recognition and stature--the only real competitor to the 
Kennedy legacy as a rival for the cultural image of what a modern president should 
look like is Ronald Reagan and although its too early to tell which of the two images 
will have a more lasting impact I think at this time the edge could be given to 
Kennedy because his image for some reason has become less associated with 
partisanship (both Democrats and Republicans are just as likely to invoke the 
Kennedy image, Dan Quale did in the 1988 campaign, while it would be unthinkable 
for a Democrat to openly flaunt his association with Reagan). In the years since 
Kennedy we have had two presidents, Carter and particularly Clinton, who have 
shared his image of youth and vigor and numerous candidates such as Hart and 
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Dukakis who were, if only for a brief time, very popular. This type of image and 
presentation was unprecedented in the years before Kennedy and, in the years since, 
is poised on the verge of becoming a standard image of what Americans expect their 
president to look like. Only time will tell how far and to what degree this trend will 
continue. 
Consumer culture and the challenges of life in the modern American 
In the Wisconsin campaign, Humphrey, as we noted before, complained that 
he felt like the comer grocer up against the chain store. It seems with Humphrey we 
have the last remnants of populism as an active force in American politics 
(even though it had a brief resurgence later with Jimmy Carter) and his defeat 
provides a nice landmark of transition into a form of political campaigning much 
more oriented toward the concerns of consumer culture. The question arises: what 
kind of effect has this had on traditional notions of the media and the public sphere 
(the debating forum of public opinion)? The media and the public sphere have 
always been the fundamental institutions in the culture of democracy envisioned by 
our founding fathers. Their faith in the will of the people was predicated on their 
means and ability of being able to rationally debate ideas. It is important to note that 
the principle goal of democratic civilization was not to improve the standard of living 
of its citizens but rather to liberate them and allow them to become freethinking 
citizens of reason. This was true when looked at from either the Protestant vision of 
civilization or the Humanist vision. 
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The question has always been asked of democratic civilizations: how free and 
how just are the People you speak so highly of--are they really capable of governing 
themselves? With the advent of the industrial revolution and the huge market 
economies, these questions have only intensified as the sturdy and independent 
yeoman farmer so long the cornerstone of democratic rhetoric faded into oblivion. 
The great early twentieth century thinkers, John Dewey and Walter Lippmann, 
attempted to reformulate the eighteenth century concepts of the media and the 
public sphere in order to simultaneously preserve their spirit while also updating 
them for the twentieth century. They both concluded that the public sphere, while 
under stress, could still through modern means of communication fulfill its main 
function as a liberating force from human ignorance and domination by facilitating 
man's rational pursuit of truth. Both men remained true to that time honored 
tradition among modem democratic theorists of placing a premium on man's 
capacity for innovation and invention to overcome whatever obstacles may be placed 
in his path toward freedom. Differing only in the amount of faith each ascribed to 
the communication professional (Lippmann) and the freethinking individual (Dewey) 
as the ultimate solution to the problem posed by mass media and mass markets, they 
both concluded that the media and the public sphere could continue and, in fact, 
improve upon its responsibility to enlighten the minds of men through the aid of 
modem technology. 
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Years later, however, at the same time as Kennedy' s campaign and across the 
ocean in Germany, a young sociologist and thinker named Jurgen Habermas was 
working on a seminal piece of his own that would revolutionize the concept of the 
media and the public sphere with respect to its place within the modern consumer 
culture. This work, entitled The Structural Traniformation of the Public Sphere, traced 
the development of the public sphere from its ancient existence in Medieval Europe, 
to its nascent modern incarnations in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
to its final form in the later part of the twentieth century. His conclusions 
concerning the nature of the contemporary media and the public sphere with respect 
to their original function within the conceptual framework of the early modern 
philosophies of the eighteen and nineteenth centuries (discussed above in reference 
to Dewey and Lippmann) are that they have completely changed. They no longer 
serve the societal function of fostering rational-critical debate originally intended for 
them by their founders in the Enlightenment. The fundamental premise of removing 
authority (Habermas uses the word authority in its connotation as a coercive and 
irrational force to achieve obedience) from government that was the central goal of 
the Enlightenment by subjecting authority to r eason and thereby transforming it 
from authority to liberating truth is no longer furthered by the public sphere. 
With the rapid and rampant growth of the market economies during the latter 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Habermas argues, came a transformation of 
the traditional concepts of the private (in this case economic) and public (in this case 
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governmental) spheres that was the lynch pin of Liberal Enlightenment philosophy. 
This change also affected, according to Habermas, the function of the public sphere 
in its purpose as a rational-critical body designed to arrive at truth and mitigate 
authority. The collection of private individuals that was the public sphere was no 
longer deemed capable to act in its own interest to protect itself from the incursions 
of authority from the private sector.[81] This new phase of government control over 
the private sector which for so long had been the antithesis of Enlightenment 
ideology Habermas refers to as "the refeudalization" of society [82] and was done 
under the overall premise of preserving the spirit of Enlightenment. Habermas 
comments on this phenomenon using a quote from the famous German despot, 
Frederick the Great, "everything for the people and nothing by them"; rational 
critical debate had a tendency to be replaced by consumption.[83] 
These themes of Habermas can be seen reflected to a remarkable degree in the 
Kennedy campaign of 1960. It is clear that with respect to, for instance, the 
religious issue, there was no real debate. The success of the Kennedy campaign in 
that issue was in its ability to come up with a winning formula that would resonate 
with the public. The real issues were ignored and, reflecting Habermas' s argument, 
the debate was largely shaped by the mass media. (84] Kennedy and his team came up 
with their argument and the role of the public was only one of acclaimation--do they 
clap or do they not clap? In particular, the power of TV in stilling debate as noted by 
Habermas is well demonstrated. It was, after all Kennedy's TV performance in that 
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West Virginia primary that was singled out by the journalist Theodore White as 
being the greatest performance of the entire campaign. Kennedy that day directed 
his argument directly at the camera and "personally" to the viewer. Within the 
context of how this exchanged is shaped by the medium of TV, it was entirely one 
way. As Habermas phrases it, the public viewing television has no opportunity to 
"talk back."[85] All they can do is agree or disagree, or, in the language of 
consumerism, they can buy it or not buy it. In the case of West Virginia and later the 
nation as a whole, they bought it. 
In order to get their victory on this crucial issue of religion the Kennedy team 
had to utilize the tools of opinion management which according to Habermas mimic 
the functions of the public sphere intended by its founders in the eighteenth century 
by giving the "false consciousness" to its audience that they are "a critically reflecting 
private people influencing public opinion" when in fact they are being persuaded by 
hidden symbols of identification, dramatic presentation of the facts, and calculated 
stereotypes.(86] The voting public of West Virginia never really thoughtfully 
debated the issue of religion in democracy. They were simply presented the two 
stereotypes of the bigoted and the tolerant citizen by a compelling and engaging 
speaker who invoked all the various symbols of virtue and solemnity he could work 
into his argument. Then they were asked to make a choice, yes or no. The people 
are free, yes; there is no gun to their head telling them how to choose. But the 
public sphere was never meant to only be a choice between two options, like 
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choosing between Coke or Pepsi. The freedom of the public in this sense is not that 
of a critically thinking public but only of a critically choosing public and ultimately 
choice is limited and almost exclusively determined by presentation. Similarly, there 
was little debate on the nature of America's role as leader of the free world in the 
Cold War during. It centered mainly around the appealing rhetoric and images with 
which each candidate could decorate their vision. Ultimately it was those of 
Kennedy and his New Frontier which were seen as the most attractive--in truth 
Kennedy won largely by default as neither Humphrey nor Nixon really came up with 
an encompassing and convincing vision of the future (Humphrey seemed to want to 
return to the past while Nixon seemed satisfied with the present) and this probably 
had much to do with their failure to connect with their potential voters. 
Finally, it is worth stating simply the basic dilemma posed by the legacy of the 
Kennedy campaign of 1960. We have entered, probably irreversibly, into the era of 
consumer culture and as Humphrey said it, "chain store" politics. Despite the often 
heard complaints to the contrary, this has given us tremendous efficiency for a nation 
the size of the United States. And, in truth, that does not mean the bad connotation 
of efficiency, blind obedience and heartlessness, that Humphrey derided but instead 
the efficiency of a government and a political process that is largely very responsive 
to the material and emotional needs of its constituency. The Soviet Union has often 
been called efficient--at least in the sense that it was described as machine like--but if 
there were a natural disaster, the citizen was largely on his own. If you sent a letter 
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across Russia there was a good chance that it would not get to its destination. The 
system works so well in America because of consumerism. It is a highly responsive 
and self correcting ideology. The problem, as Habermas points out, is that it is a 
system that operates through the auspices of competing interests and is largely 
self-driven and from the point of view of the individual completely irrational and 
beyond his or her control. It is also a system almost completely devoid of any strong 
principles or character. From the president to the average citizen you can be assured 
that the system will take care of you so long as you work within it but, consequently, 
you are never truly free in the sense of being a rational, critical-thinking citizen with 
some sense of broader perspective and purpose--you are only a part in the process. 
We are all increasingly subject to a benign, efficient, but unrelenting authority that is 
the consensus of the marketplace, or to reiterate the words of that enlightened 
despot, Frederick the Great, and mix them with John Kennedy we live in a "New 
Frontier" but it is one where "everything [is] for the people and nothing [is] by them." 
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